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An Overview of the Arkansas
Civil Rights Act of 1993
Theresa M. Beiner*
INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Arkansas legislature enacted a law that
was novel for this state but on a parity with laws enacted in
most of the United States. After almost thirty years of
avoiding issues that the rest of the country had already ad-
dressed,1 Arkansas enacted its first modern civil rights act,
the Civil Rights Act of 1993 (hereinafter "the Arkansas
Act"). Finally, Arkansas, only one of two states that had no
civil rights legislation,2 enacted a law that would cover dis-
crimination based on race, religion, national origin, gender
and disability.3  Yet, three years after the statute was en-
acted, litigants have filed very few cases under the new
law.4 This is especially surprising given that the Arkansas
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of
Law. Research for this article was funded in part by a grant from the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Ranko
Shiraki Oliver of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. Dan Pless of the Arkan-
sas Fair Housing Council, and Tim Humphries for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this article.
1. Civil rights legislation on the federal level dates back to the Reconstruction
era. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1994). The preeminent civil rights legislation cov-
ering employment discrimination, Title VII, was enacted in 1964. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). In 1943, Connecticut became the first state to create a
civil rights commission. Michael Arbanas, Arkansas Lacks Civil Rights Statutes, AR.
KANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 20, 1991, at A10.
2. The 1992 Campaign: Voters; Clinton Trying to Hold Support Among Blacks,
THE NEw YORK TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at A12.
3. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102 (Supp. 1995).
4. This is based on the number of reported decisions that even mention the
Arkansas Act. As of the date of this article, there are only five reported cases in
Arkansas state courts, and none of these cases actually interprets the Arkansas Act
in any meaningful sense. See Malone v. Trans-States Lines, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 659
(Ark. 1996); Citizens to Establish a Reform Party in Arkansas v. Priest, 926 S.W.2d
432 (Ark. 1996); Masterson v. Stambuck, 902 S.W.2d 803 (Ark. 1995); McCuen v.
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Act actually offers the potential plaintiff several advantages
over parallel federal laws. However, it does not mean that
it is always preferable to file under state law; for the state
act also leaves several significant areas uncovered, which
will be more fully explored in this article.5
It is difficult to account for the lack of interest this stat-
ute has generated among potential plaintiffs (and their at-
torneys) in Arkansas. Perhaps it is due to the Arkansas
Bar's reliance on federal law,6 as the principal means of vin-
dicating civil rights. Plaintiffs' attorneys have become so
accustomed to suing under the federal laws prohibiting dis-
criminatory conduct that they do not want the bother of
learning the new state law. It is also possible that the Bar
views the federal courts as more receptive to civil rights
claims than state courts. This does not explain why parties
have not tagged the state law claims onto their federal
claims through supplemental jurisdiction.7 Yet, there are
very few reported federal cases that include Arkansas civil
rights claims.8 Often plaintiffs include all parallel state
claims along with their federal claims. Although the relief
for employment discrimination is essentially the same
Harris, 902 S.W.2d 793 (Ark. 1995); City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 887 S.W.2d 296
(Ark. 1994).
5. See Richard F. Richards, The Arkansas Civil Rights Act: Sometimes the
Only Remedy for Employment Discrimination, 1996 ARK. L. NOTES 87, 88 (1996).
6. Federal law only requires notice pleading, where Arkansas law requires fact
pleading. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a); ARK. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Indeed, in one of the few
cases decided under the Arkansas Act, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld dismis-
sal for failure to state a claim under fact pleading standards. See Malone, 926 S.W.2d
at 661.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994) (allowing a plaintiff to bring non-federal
claims in federal court so long as there is basis for federal jurisdiction and the state
law claims arise out of the same case or controversy).
8. As of the date this article went to print, there were four federal cases citing
the Arkansas Act: McCullough v. Horton, 69 F.3d 918, 919 (8th Cir. 1995); Coates v.
Kelley, 1997 WL 101895 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 27, 1997); Morrow v. City of Jacksonville,
941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996); Smith v. Foote's Dixie Dandy, Inc., 941 F. Supp.
807 (E.D. Ark. 1995). In only two of these cases does the court engage in a mean-
ingful analysis of the Arkansas Act. See Morrow, 941 F. Supp. at 820, 823; Smith,
941 F. Supp. at 809-810.
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under both state and federal laws, it certainly does not
hurt-at least on the face of it9-to include the state claim.
Perhaps it is also due to a lack of knowledge on the
part of the Bar as to how the law actually will operate in a
given case. With few court interpretations of the Arkansas
Act to guide prospective plaintiffs, why risk losing a cause
of action that clearly exists under federal law? 10 Perhaps it
is simply that nobody is aware of the law. However, a re-
view of local news reports on the Arkansas Act suggests
that it did get coverage by the media at the time of its initial
passage and that most people would have at least heard
that the legislature had passed some sort of civil rights
legislation."
For whatever reason, the Arkansas Act has not
spawned a significant amount of litigation. An investiga-
tion into precisely what this Act does and what potential
advantages and disadvantages it possesses over parallel fed-
9. However, there is the argument that inclusion of the state claim adds noth-
ing in terms of remedies and simply confuses what might be a simple case under
federal law.
10. There are several ways a plaintiff could lose his or her federal cause of
action by filing a state claim, although a careful lawyer should not do so. First, if a
plaintiff files a state claim and is unsuccessful, she runs the risk that res judicata or
collateral estoppel (also known as claim preclusion and issue preclusion, respec-
tively) will bar litigation of the parallel federal claim in federal court. See generally
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); University of Tenn. v. Elli-
ott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986); Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir.
1997) (litigation of stale claim barred federal action under ADEA). Also, there are
charge filing requirements under federal law. If the plaintiff fails to file a timely
charge with the EEOC because she is pursuing her state law claim, she likely will be
barred from pursuing her federal claim later unless she can make some sort of toll-
ing argument. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(i) (1994).
11. See, e.g., Glen Chase, Tucker Opposes Including Gay Rights in State Bias
Bill, ARKANSAS DeMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 10, 1993, at B3; Noel Oman, With Civil
Rights Bills on Desk, Tucker Dallies on Details, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Mar. 31, 1993, at B5; Noel Oman, Tucker Buys Time on New Laws Regarding Civil
Rights at Work, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Apr. 1, 1993, at B4; Noel Oman,
Tucker "Happy" with Rights Bill as Deadline Nears, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GA-
ZETTE, Apr. 7,1993, at B4; Rachel O'Neal, Task Force Favors Senator's Civil Rights
Bill, Feb. 17, 1993, at B1; Rachel O'Neal, Senate Loads Up 2 Civil Rights Bills, but
House Dumps 1, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTrE, Mar. 24, 1993, at Al; Michael
Trimble & Rachel O'Neal, Committee Leaves Gays Out of Bill, ARKANSAS DEMO-
CRAT-GAzETrE, Feb. 24, 1993, at B1; Kevin Walker, Task Force to Tackle Civil
Rights Bills, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 1993, at B4; Kevin Walker,
Groups Seek Inclusion in Rights Bill, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAzETTE, Feb. 9,'
1993, at B1.
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eral laws may provide some answers to these questions as
well as inform the Arkansas Bar about how this law might
operate in practice. This article will begin by describing the
history of the Arkansas Act as best as possible without an
official legislative history.12 What follows is a thorough de-
scription of the entire Arkansas Act. Throughout the dis-
cussion of various aspects of the Arkansas Act, parallel
federal laws are noted and described, with a view toward
highlighting differences in the state and federal laws as well
as resolving potential ambiguities in the state law.1 3
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Numerous articles appeared in national newspapers
while then-Governor Clinton was running for the presi-
dency criticizing him for his pro-civil rights stance while
serving as the governor of a state that had no civil rights
act.14 This charge, made by former California Governor
12. The Arkansas Legislature does not keep any official legislative history.
However, the courts do consider legislative history in construing statutes, although
any sort of intent is generally contained in the statute itself. See, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 10-3-201 (Repl. 1996); Haase v. Starnes, 915 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Ark. 1996)
(Dudley, J., dissenting); Stucco, Inc. v. Rose, 914 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Ark. App. 1996)
(en banc) (Rogers, J., dissenting). Arkansas courts look first at the plain meaning of
the statute in the context within which it is written. Stucco, 914 S.W.2d at 772. In
addition, the courts look at the subject matter of the statute, "the object to be ac-
complished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided ... and other appropri-
ate matters that throw light on the matter." Id. Recently, in the context of
deciphering two conflicting statutes, the court stated, "As a guide in ascertaining
legislative intent, we often examine the history of the statutes involved, as well as
the contemporaneous conditions at the time of their enactment, the consequences of
interpretation, and all other matters of common knowledge within the court's juris-
diction." Priest, 926 S.W.2d at 435. Finally, the courts look to the intent behind
similar federal legislation where appropriate. Moore v. State, 903 S.W.2d 154, 159
(Ark. 1995).
13. Because of the broad nature of the civil rights violations the Arkansas Act
covers, it is impossible to detail every difference between it and parallel federal laws.
I hope to highlight the most significant differences and provide sources, through
citation, to other works that detail the scope and finer points of parallel federal acts.
14. See, e.g., Paul Richter & Art Pine, Clinton Sounds Theme of Change, Calls
Bush Divisive Democrats: Brown Stumps Philadelphia, Where He Draws Compari-
son Between Environmental Pollution and Corruption in Politics, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at A17; Sam Roberts, The 1992 Campaign: Voters; Clinton
Trying to Hold Support Among Blacks, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at
A12.
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Jerry Brown, the Reverend Jesse Jackson 15 and eventually
President George Bush,'6 had some effect on the campaign.
Arkansas, along with Alabama, had the dubious honor of
being one of only two states in the United States that did
not have some sort of civil rights legislation.17
In fact, as governor in 1991, Clinton had tried to pass
civil rights legislation in Arkansas. 8 Civil rights legislation
was introduced during Arkansas' 1991 legislative session
and was approved by the Senate.19 The legislators appar-
ently were motivated by the erosion of federal civil rights
laws and the lack of any gap-filling by the state of Arkan-
sas.20 The law was intended in part to mirror the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (also known as section 1983),1
which gave individuals a cause of action against the state
for violation of their rights by state actors.2 At the time,
the Arkansas constitution gave individuals significant
rights; however, there was no enforcement mechanism to
guarantee that these rights were upheld absent some action
by the state against an individual.2 3  Initially, the support-
ing legislators envisioned a series of bills rather than one
all-encompassing measure.24 In creating several bills, they
hoped to avoid having the entire law fail based on a small
controversial sub-part.
It does not appear from the newspaper accounts that
separate laws were actually introduced. Instead, the initial
1991 legislation was drafted broadly and prohibited discrim-
15. Roberts, supra note 13; Richter & Pine, supra note 13.
16. See Howard Kurtz, Dogfight on the Air Waves; Bush Radio Ads Distort
Clinton's Stances, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 24, 1992, at Al.
17. The 1992 Campaign: Voters; Clinton Trying to Hold Support Among the
Blacks, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at A12.
18. Kevin Walker, Task Force to Tackle Civil Rights Bills, ARKANSAS DEMO-
CRAT-GAZETrE, Feb. 2,1993, at B4.
19. Michael Arbanas, Legislators to Propose Package of Civil Rights Laws, AR.
KANSAS-GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 1991, at B7.
20. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
23. Michael Arbanas, Arkansas Lacks Civil Rights Statutes, ARKANSAS GA-
ZErTE, Jan. 20, 1991, at A10.
24. Michael Arbanas, Legislators to Propose Package of Civil Rights Laws, AR-
KANSAS GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 1991, at B7.
25. Id.
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ination based on race, religion, ancestry, national origin,
gender, and disability. It was also aimed at violations by
the state and hate crimes, making actionable incidents of
harassment, intimidation or violence against people be-
cause they belong to a certain group. z6 This bill, like the
Arkansas Act eventually passed, did not contemplate the
creation of an Arkansas Civil Rights Commission, but in-
stead gave plaintiffs a right to bring their own claims di-
rectly in court.27 The bill that eventually passed the Senate
prohibited discrimination in "employment, public facilities,
financial transactions and the political process. '28 It cov-
ered discrimination based on "race, religion, ancestry, na-
tional origin, gender and disability. '29 It also included hate
crimes coverage.3°
Once the companion bill was introduced into the
House, it met strong political opposition from the Arkansas
Chamber of Commerce. 31 In addition, several local busi-
nesses, including Union National Bank, International Pa-
per, and the Arkansas Poultry Federation met with
Governor Clinton in an effort to reach a compromise on the
bill.3 Businesses were concerned with several aspects of
the bill: (1) jury trials; (2) a proposed three-year statute of
limitations; and (3) paying attorney's fees, as well as com-
pensatory and punitive damages. 33 At the time this legisla-
tion was being considered, it provided for additional
damages not then available under federal law.34 Local busi-
nessmen were concerned that this would deter other busi-
26. Civil Rights Protected under Bill, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1991, at B7.
27. Id.
28. Michael Arbanas, Senate Passes Rights Bill, ARKANSAS GAZETrE, Feb. 22,
1991, at 13.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Caroline Decker, Civil Rights Proposal Being Negotiated at Clinton's Bid-
ding, ARKANSAS GAZETTE. Mar. 8, 1991, at Al; Max Parker, House Committee
Unanimously Recommends Civil Rights Proposal, ARKANSAS GAZETrE, Mar. 6,
1991, at H5.
32. Caroline Decker, Civil Rights Proposal Being Negotiated at Clinton's Bid-
ding, ARKANSAS GAZETrE, Mar. 8, 1991, at Al.
33. Id.
34. Attorney's fees were already available under Title VII. However, compen-
satory and punitive damages were not available under Title VII until the enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). See generally Charles W.
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nesses from locating in Arkansas and encourage other
businesses to leave the state. 5 In addition, the law covered
all businesses in the state-there was no set number of em-
ployees a company had to employ in order to fall within the
Act's proscriptions.3 6
Eventually, the Chamber of Commerce introduced its
own bill.3 7 After several attempts at compromise,38 a stale-
mate was reached.3 9  The Chamber of Commerce's
watered-down bill eventually passed the House. 0 Finally,
no bill became law,41 but instead the Senate created a Com-
mission to consider creating civil rights legislation during
the next legislative session.42
By 1993, the next legislative session, the Arkansas leg-
islature was ready to give civil rights legislation another try.
Initially, three different bills were proposed. One was spon-
sored by Senator Bill Lewellen of Marianna (which was en-
dorsed by the Civil Rights Task Force, a lobbyist group),
one was sponsored by Representative Bill Walker of Little
Rock, who proposed the 1991 House bill, and one was
Hemingway, A Review of Administrative Compensatory Damage Award Decisions
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991,.41 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 688 (1994).
35. Caroline Decker, Civil Rights Proposal Being Negotiated at Clinton's Bid-
ding, ARKANSAS GAZEr-rE, Mar. 8, 1991, at A17.
36. Id.
37. Caroline Decker. Chamber Ends Negotiations on Civil Rights Act. ARKAN-
SAS GAZE-rrE, Mar. 9, 1991, at G2.
38. Caroline Decker, Civil Rights Bill Amendment More Beneficial to Business,
ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Mar. 12, 1991, at G2.
39. Caroline Decker, Civil Rights Proposal in Clinton's Hands, ARKANSAS GA-
ZETrE, Mar. 16, 1991, at A8; Caroline Decker, Civil Rights Proposals Postponed,
ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Mar. 19, 1991, at G6; Caroline Decker, Sponsors Reject Deal
on Rights Bill, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Mar. 21, 1991, at HI.
40. Scott Morris & Caroline Decker, House Passes Chamber-Backed Rights
Bill, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Mar. 20, 1991, at Al.
41. Indeed, the House Committee on Public Health, Labor and Welfare ad-
journed before a presentation by proponents of the more liberal legislation in order
to avoid letting the supporting legislators even speak. Caroline Decker, Panel Stops
Civil Rights Bill by Refusing to Bring it Up, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1991, at
H5.
42. Caroline Decker, Rights Study, Not Bill, Backed, ARKANSAS GAZETTE,
Mar. 22, 1991, at 14; Caroline Decker, Senate Approves Task Force to Study, Write
Civil Rights Bill, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Mar. 23, 1991, at A12; Max Parker, Senate
Authorizes Rights Task Force, ARKANSAS GAZETTE , Mar. 28,1991, at 16. The gov-
ernor, House speaker and Senate president pro tempore were each responsible for
appointing five members to the task force.
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sponsored by Representative Bob Fairchild of Fayette-
ville. 3 There was also a bill proposed by Little Rock attor-
ney Russell Gunter, a member of the Civil Rights Task
Force." Much of the battle during the bill's passage (pub-
licly documented by the media) concerned the extent of the
Arkansas Act's coverage. Specifically, there was some de-
bate as to whether discrimination based on disability and
homosexuality should be included. 5 There was also debate
concerning placing a cap on damages. 6 Further discussion
centered on which businesses, based on the number of em-
ployees, would be subjected to the Act's coverage. 7 The
proposals for the number of employees ranged anywhere
from zero to fifteen, which is the number set by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter "Title VII").48
The ultimate debate as portrayed in the media was between
nine or fifteen. At nine, the coverage extended to approxi-
mately 200,000 additional Arkansas residents.4 9 There was
also debate regarding the inclusion of certain types of con-
duct, for example, hate crimes and housing discrimination.50
Ultimately, the bill that passed was a compromise, which
covered some of these areas, while omitting others.
43. Noel Oman, With Civil Rights Bill on Desk, Tucker Dallies on Details, AR-
KANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 31, 1993, at B5; Kevin Walker, Task Force to
Tackle Civil Rights Bills, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 1993, at B4.
44. Kevin Walker, Task Force to Tackle Civil Rights Bills, ARKANSAS DEMO-
CRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 1993, at B4.
45. Glen Chase, Tucker Opposes Including Gay Rights in State Bias Bill, AR-
KANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 10, 1993, at B3; Mike Trimble & Rachel O'Neal,
Committee Leaves Gays Out of Bill, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 24,
1993, at B1; Kevin Walker, Task Force to Tackle Civil Rights Bills, ARKANSAS DEM-
OCRAT-GAZE-f'E, Feb. 2, 1993, at B4; Kevin Walker, Groups Seek Inclusion in
Rights Bill, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTrE, Feb. 9, 1993, at B1.
46. Kevin Walker, Task Force to Tackle Civil Rights Bills, ARKANSAS DEMO-
CRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 1993, at B4.
47. Rachel O'Neal, Senate Loads Up 2 Civil Rights Bills, but House Dumps 1,
ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 24, 1993, at Al.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
49. Noel Oman, With Civil Rights Bills on Desk, Tucker Dallies on Details, AR-
KANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Mar. 31, 1993, at B5.
50. Noel Oman, Tucker "Happy" with Rights Bill as Deadline Nears, ARKAN-
SAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Apr. 7, 1993, at B4.
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II. LANGUAGE AND COVERAGE OF THE
ARKANSAS ACT
A detailed description of the Arkansas Civil Rights
Act is necessary to fully understand the broad nature of the
Arkansas Act as well as the causes of action that it creates.
The Arkansas Act gives significant civil rights protection to
the citizens of Arkansas in several areas, even though the
area of employment discrimination provoked the most
debate.51
Section 16-123-107 of the Arkansas Act (hereinafter
"section 107"), which contains the employment discrimina-
tion section, also prohibits discrimination in contracts, pub-
lic accommodations, property transactions, and voting.
Section 16-123-104 of the Arkansas Act provides a cause of
action for hate crimes. In addition, the Arkansas Act pro-
vides for protection against governmental actors who vio-
late people's rights under color of state law. During the
1995 legislative session, a new section covering housing dis-
crimination was added to the law. 2 Because the housing
discrimination provisions were added later as separate sec-
tions to the Arkansas Act, they will be addressed separately
in this article.
A. Section 107 Coverage
Section 107 of the Arkansas Act protects persons
against discrimination based on various types of statuses-
race, religion, national origin, gender, and disability. 3 The
legislature gave several of these groups more explicit treat-
ment in the definitional section of the Act. Specifically,
religion is defined to include "all aspects of religious belief,
observance, and practice. ' 54 In addition, national origin is
defined to include ancestry.55 Gender discrimination in-
cludes discrimination "on account of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions. '56 Finally, disability discrimi-
51. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
52. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-201-210 (Supp. 1995).
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107 (Supp. 1995).
54. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(8) (Supp. 1995).
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(6) (Supp. 1995).
56. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(1) (Supp. 1995).
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nation includes discrimination based on the presence of any
sensory, mental, or physical disability, which is defined as
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a
major life function. ' 57 Alcoholism, along with several other
disorders, is explicitly denied coverage as a disability under
the Arkansas Act,58 while parallel federal legislation does
cover it.59
Along with these protected groups, the Arkansas Act
sets out what types of discrimination are unlawful. The Ar-
kansas Act creates a series of "rights," which in turn creates
a right of action for persons injured by acts of "intentional
discrimination" in violation of the Act.6" These protections
include the right to: obtain and hold employment;61 "ac-
commodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any
place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage or
amusement; ' 62 "engage in property transactions without
discrimination; '63 "engage in credit and other contractual
transactions without discrimination; 64 and "vote and fully
participate in the political process. 65 Obviously, the Act
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(3) (Supp. 1995). The definition expressly
excludes compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, illegal drug use, and alco-
holism. Id. One federal court has indirectly addressed what is a disability for pur-
poses of the Arkansas Act. In Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, 941 F. Supp. 816, 823
(E.D. Ark. 1996), the district court used ADA analysis to conclude that whether
obesity is a disability covered by the Arkansas Act is a question of fact. The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, parallel federal legislation covering discrimination against
individuals with disabilities, similarly contains exclusions from the term "disability."
However, the federal act contains some additional exclusions, including
"[t]ransvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender iden-
tity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior dis-
orders" as well as "psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current
illegal use of drugs," homosexuality, and bisexuality. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(d)(1), (3)
(1996).
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(3) (Supp. 1995).
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(b)(4) (1996). See also Richards, supra note 5, at 88
(describing exclusion of alcoholism as a limitation on the Arkansas Act's coverage).
60. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(b) (Supp. 1995).
61. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).
62. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(2) (Supp. 1995).
63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(3) (Supp. 1995).
64. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(4) (Supp. 1995).
65. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(5) (Supp. 1995).
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goes well beyond employment discrimination and consti-
tutes a broad-based civil rights statute.66
1. Employment Discrimination Sections
a. Definitions of "Employer" and "Employee"
For purposes of discrimination in employment, the Ar-
kansas Act defines employer as "a person who employs
nine or more employees in Arkansas in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, or any agent of such person. ' 67 The implications of
this language are fairly obvious. Although the term em-
ployee is not directly defined, it does not include "[a]n indi-
vidual employed outside the State of Arkansas. 68
Therefore, the Arkansas Act's coverage extends only to
businesses employing the requisite number of employees in
Arkansas. In addition, an individual working for an Arkan-
sas employer outside of the state would not be a covered
"employee" within the plain language of the Arkansas Act.
Finally, the Arkansas Act does not cover causes of action
against employers by members of the employer's immedi-
ate family. If the plaintiff is employed by a corporation
with stock owned by an immediate family member, the Ar-
kansas Act most likely would not provide an exemption.69
One of the few cases interpreting the Arkansas Act has
addressed the "employer" definition. In Morrow v. City of
Jacksonville,7 ° a federal court decided that individual actors
could not be held liable in their individual capacities as the
plaintiff's "employer" for purposes of the Arkansas Act.7'
While the court did not state its precise reasons for this
66. Housing discrimination, a more recent addition to the Arkansas Act not
included in rights described in § 107, will be discussed separately in this article. See
infra notes 276-327 and accompanying text.
67. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(5) (Supp. 1995).
68. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(4)(C) (Supp. 1995). In addition, the Arkan-
sas Act does not apply to "[ainy individual employed by his or her parents, spouse
or child," or "[a]n individual participating in a specialized employment training pro-
gram conducted by a nonprofit sheltered workshop or rehabilitation facility." ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-102(4)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1995).
69. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(4)(A) (Supp. 1995).
70. 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
71. Id. at 820.
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holding, it is noteworthy that the lawsuit was not dismissed
against the individuals in their "official" capacities. This is
consistent with many courts' opinions under Title VII, in-
cluding those of the Eighth Circuit, which limit liability to
the actual employer.72
There are two potentially meaningful differences in the
definition of employer between the Arkansas Act, Title
VII, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (here-
inafter "ADA"), the counterpart federal legislation.73 The
Arkansas Civil Rights Act defines "employer" as an entity
having nine or more employees. 74 Both Title VII and the
ADA cover employers of fifteen or more. 75 As was noted
earlier in this article, this makes the Arkansas Act applica-
ble to approximately 200,000 more working Arkansans.76
Obviously, if an employer has less than fifteen employees,
but at least nine, the Arkansas Act is the employee's pri-
mary way to sue a private employer for employment
discrimination.77
The manner in which employees are counted for this
calculation is slightly different. Under the Arkansas Act,
the employer need only have nine employees work for
twenty calendar weeks to be considered an employer for
purposes of the Arkansas Act.78 Under Title VII and the
ADA, the statute reads that the employer must have fifteen
employees "for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks. ' 79 This implies that the fifteen employees
72. Id. at 819-20, and cases cited therein.
73. The ADA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(5) (Supp. 1995).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (1994).
76. See supra note 49.
77. The term "primary" is used here because the federal § 1981 covers employ-
ment discrimination based on race and has no limit on the number of employees an
employer must have to be covered under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). The
term "private employer" is used here because many acts of employment discrimina-
tion by public sector employers are actionable under § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1164 (1994) (sexual harassment claim can be brought under § 1983);
Headley v. Bacon, 828 F.2d 1272, 1274 (8th Cir. 1987) (describing overlap between
§ 1983 and Title VII). But see Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1990)
(sexual harassment not cognizable under § 1983).
78. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(5) (Supp. 1995).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (1994).
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must work every day of the week that is considered a "work
day" to be counted, which would arguably take an em-
ployer of fifteen out of Title VII's reach if it employed one
of the fifteen on a part-time basis. The Arkansas Act ap-
parently has no such requirement and should not cause the
same sorts of ambiguities that Title VII initially spawned in
counting employees.80 ,
There are several distinctions based on the definition
of employee. The Arkansas Act excludes persons em-
ployed by parents, spouses, or, children; persons employed
in certain training programs; and persons employed outside
Arkansas. 81 Title VII only excludes state-elected officials
and some of their appointed staff members.82 The ADA
has no exceptions of this sort. Therefore, there is a limita-
tion on the definition of employee in the Arkansas Act that
is not found in parallel federal legislation.
In addition, the language of the two acts regarding
pregnancy differs significantly. The Arkansas Act generally
prohibits discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy. '83 The
federal act defines discrimination on the basis of sex as "be-
cause of or on the basis of pregnancy." Furthermore, the
federal act states that "women affected by pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes, including re-
ceipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inabil-
ity to work." 84 This language has led courts to liken preg-
nancy to other statuses unprotected by Title VII and has
provided a basis for adverse employment actions against
pregnant women.8 5 The express prohibition of discrimina-
80. The United States Supreme Court recently resolved this ambiguity in fed-
eral law. In Waiters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997), the Court
adopted the "payroll" method of counting employees, whereby a count of employ-
ees actually on the payroll is used to determine whether the employer has the requi-
site number of employees.
81. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(4) (Supp. 1995).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
83. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(1) (Supp. 1995).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
85. See, e.g., Marafino v. St. Louis County Cir. Ct., 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir.
1983). In this case, the employer refused to hire a pregnant woman because she
would soon take a leave of absence. The employer successfully argued it would treat
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tion based on pregnancy in the Arkansas Act, however,
could be read to prohibit any adverse employment action
taken due to an employee's pregnancy.86
b. Definitions of "Employment Discrimination"
There are several significant distinctions in the defini-
tion of "discrimination" under the federal acts and the Ar-
kansas Act. Of particular note is the discrepancy between
what is required under federal law for disability discrimina-
tion and what is required under state law. Further, the
types of discriminatory acts covered under state law appear
to be less broad than under federal law.
First, the Arkansas Act only creates a right to "obtain
and hold employment. '87 Title VII, on the other hand,
makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.88
The ADA likewise contains broad language prohibiting a
variety of discriminatory conduct by employers89 and ex-
tends to "terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment." 90 Title VII and the ADA are clearly broader,
encompassing not only obtaining and holding employment
but also the terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment. The courts have extended Title VII to encompass a
any potential employee about to take a leave of absence in the same manner.
Therefore, the employer's refusal to hire the pregnant woman was not based on her
pregnancy but instead on her need for leave.
86. See Richards, supra note 5, at 90-91.
87. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
89. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a)-(b) (1994).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
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broad variety of discriminatory acts, 91 including distinctions
in fringe benefits92 and even lunch hours.93 Plaintiffs have
also used Title VII to address discrimination in promo-
tions,94 assignments, 95 and pay. 6
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has in-
terpreted Title VII to cover harassment.97 Courts have ap-
plied hostile environment claims to harassment based on
disability as well. 98  The Supreme Court has determined
that if harassment is sufficiently severe and pervasive so
that it amounts to a change in a term or condition of em-
ployment, the harassment is actionable under Title VII.
The harassment could be based on race,99 sex,100 religion, 10 1
or national origin. 02
While the Arkansas Act does not contain the "term,
condition, or privilege" language of Title VII, there is room
to argue that harassment might well be covered. The Ar-
91. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); Keenan
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 707 F.2d 1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 1983) (recognizing
that Title VII encompasses reprimands under an employer's garnishment policy);
McClain v. Southwest Steel Co., 940 F. Supp. 295, 301 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (extending
hostile environment claims to the ADA). See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (emphasizing Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality).
92. See, e.g., Keenan, 707 F.2d at 1277.
93. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ball Corp., 661 F.2d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 1981).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Criminal Sheriff, Parish of Orleans, 19 F.3d 238,
239 (5th Cir. 1994). See also Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73-75 (1984)
(consideration for law partnership considered term, condition, or privilege of
employment).
95. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986).
96. Ball, 661 F.2d at 540. The Equal Pay Act specifically covers discrepancies
in pay between men and women. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994). Pay distinctions
based on other categories outlined in Title VII can be addressed using Title VII.
See, e.g., Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074 (3rd Cir. 1996) (involv-
ing race); Pirela v. Village of North Aurora, 935 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.D. 983 (1991) (involving race and national origin).
97. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
98. McClain v. Southwest Steel Co., 940 F. Supp. 295, 301 (N.D. Okla. 1996);
Gray v. Ameritech Corp., 937 F. Supp. 762, 771 (N.D. I11. 1996) (assuming harass-
ment claims are available under the ADA).
99. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. See, e.g., Ways v. City of Lincoln, 871 F.2d 750,
754 (8th Cir. 1989).
100. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-67.
101. See id. at 66. See, e.g., Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 635 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
102. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. See, e.g., Hetzel v. County of Prince William, 89
F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 584 (1996).
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kansas Act creates a right to "obtain and hold employ-
ment." Harassment based on a protected status could
greatly affect a person's ability to hold employment. In-
deed, if the harassment is pervasive enough, it may be im-
possible for a person to remain employed without risk of
psychological damage. Therefore, a plaintiff could argue
that, to the extent harassment makes it difficult or impossi-
ble to "obtain and hold employment," it should be actiona-
ble under the Arkansas Act. Indeed, one federal court
interpreting the Arkansas Act assumed that it covered har-
assment. 10 3 It is not clear, however, whether the Title VII
standards for harassment will be adopted. To be actionable
under Title VII, harassment need only affect a term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment. Therefore, the plaintiff
need not experience any concrete psychological harm to
pursue a claim. 04 Under the Arkansas Act, harassment
would have to affect the person's ability to obtain or hold
employment. This suggests a slightly higher standard.
The Arkansas courts could borrow from constructive
discharge case law to determine whether harassment affects
the employee's ability to hold employment. 0 5 The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "[t]o constitute a con-
structive discharge, the employer must deliberately create
intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing
103. Smith, 941 F. Supp. at 809-810. The tort of outrage can also be used in the
sexual harassment context. See Hale v. Ladd, 826 S.W.2d 244 (Ark. 1992). How-
ever, in order to be actionable under this theory, the harassment must be "so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized soci-
ety." Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ark. 1988).
104. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
105. Under Title VII, an employee can maintain an action for discriminatory
termination if the employee quits due to difficult working conditions. A thorough
discussion of constructive discharge is beyond the scope of this article. For more on
this concept. see Kathryn A. Johnson, Constructive Discharge and "Reasonable Ac-
commodation" under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 175
(1993); Mark S. Kende, Deconsiructing Constructive Discharge: The Misapplication
of Constructive Discharge Standards in Employment Discrimination Remedies, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 39 (1995); Sarah H. Perry, Enough is Enough: Per Se Con-
structive Discharge for Victims of Sexually Hostile Work Environments under Title
VII, 70 WASH. L. REV. 541 (1995).
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the employee to quit and the employee must quit."'01 6 A
constructive discharge arises only "when a reasonable per-
son would find the conditions of employment intolera-
ble. 1 °7 In addition, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
requires the employee "not to jump to conclusions too
quickly," and to give the "employer a reasonable chance to
work out a problem" before arguing constructive dis-
charge.108 Because the standard for constructive discharge
is higher than the standard applied to harassment claims, 109
adopting constructive discharge standards for harassment
places a fairly heavy burden on an employee suing on a har-
assment claim. For this reason Arkansas courts may adopt
the harassment standards applied under Title VII.
Another significant distinction between the Arkansas
Act and the federal law is in the area of disability discrimi-
nation. It is not clear under the Arkansas Act that an em-
ployer must make reasonable accommodations for an
individual's disability. Indeed, there is no language at all
regarding accommodation of physical or mental disabili-
ties. °10 Because there is explicit language in the Arkansas
Act regarding religious accommodations, it could be in-
ferred that there is no disability accommodation contem-
plated under the Act. However, an accommodations
requirement might be read into the Arkansas Act's "obtain
and hold employment" language. An accommodation that
is necessary for a person with disabilities to "obtain and
hold employment" would directly affect his or her ability to
exercise this right. In effect, the right could become mean-
ingless to persons with disabilities if the courts do not read
an accommodation requirement into the Arkansas Act.
Regardless of the outcome on this issue, the accommoda-
106. Tidwell v. Meyer's Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing
Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981)).
107. Id. (citing Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d
281, 285 (8th Cir. 1993)).
108. Id. (citing West v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 54 F.3d 493, 498 (8th Cir.
1995)).
109. Perry, supra note 105, at 546-51.
110. The public accommodations language, however, may be read broadly to
encompass reasonable accommodations. See infra notes 134-143 and accompanying
text.
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tion provisions of the ADA are still applicable to employers
of fifteen or more.
Finally, there is no remedy for age discrimination
under the Arkansas Act. Although apparently age was cov-
ered under the proposed 1991 legislation, age discrimina-
tion did not survive in the final version of the Arkansas
Act. If an employee believes he or she is being discrimi-
nated against based on age, the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act"' provides the principal basis for relief in
Arkansas. 112
2. Public Accommodations Discrimination
In addition to creating the "right to obtain and hold
employment," the Arkansas Act creates a right to "the full
enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facil-
ities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommo-
dation, assemblage, or amusement[.] '"" 3  Such places
specifically include "any place, store, or other establish-
ment, either licensed or unlicensed, that supplies accommo-
dations, goods, or services to the general public, or that
solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general
public, or that is supported directly or indirectly by govern-
ment funds[.]"" 4  It does not include a lodging establish-
ment with five rooms or less that is occupied by the
proprietor of the establishment as his or her residence. 15
In addition, it does not include private clubs that are not in
fact open to the public." 6
The proscription of discrimination in public accommo-
dations as detailed in this statute goes well beyond those
111. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
112. Other federal laws such as § 1983 provide alternate bases for relief against
defendants acting under color of state law under appropriate circumstances. See
Morrow, 941 F. Supp. at 826 (holding that age is not covered by the Arkansas Act;
but stating that "deprivation of a right secured by Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA
by one acting under color of state law constitutes grounds for a § 1983 claim").
113. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(2) (Supp. 1995). This is very similar to
the public accommodation language of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994).
114. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7) (Supp. 1995).
115. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7)(A) (Supp. 1995). Such a lodging should
be covered under the fair housing sections of the Arkansas Act. See infra notes 276-
327 and accompanying text.
116. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7)(B) (Supp. 1995).
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contained in the parallel federal law-Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter "the Public Accommoda-
tions Act")."17 However, it is not clear whether the Arkan-
sas Act goes as far as the accommodation sections of the
ADA. 118 The Public Accommodations Act prohibits dis-
crimination by lodging establishments, 19 restaurants,'120 and
entertainment establishments,' 2' and "any establishment...
which is physically located within the premises of any estab-
lishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or... within
the premises of which is physically located any such covered
establishment, and.., which holds itself out as serving pa-
trons of such covered establishment.' 1 22 Like the state act,
Title II exempts private clubs.2 3
From the plain language of these statutes, it is obvious
that the Arkansas Act is more broadly written. The federal
act is limited to places of public amusement, while the Ar-
kansas Act would apply to any establishment open to the
public with a few limited exceptions. 24  Although the
courts have broadly construed the federal act to include
more unconventional places of amusement, 25 Title II has
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
118. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). See infra notes 134-143 and accompa-
nying text.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (1994). Lodging establishments include hotels, mo-
tels, or inns. Like the Arkansas Act, the establishment must have five rooms or
more to be covered by the Public Accommodations Act. Id.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(2) (1994). It specifically applies to "any restaurant,
cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally en-
gaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to,
any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline
station." Id.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (1994). Entertainment establishments include
movie theaters, live theaters, concerts halls, sports arenas, or stadiums. Id.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(4) (1994).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1994). Commentators have discussed potential First
Amendment limitations on state public accommodations laws. See, e.g., Pamela
Griffin, Comment, Exclusion and Access in Public Accommodations: First Amend-
ment Limitations upon State Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 1047 (1985). However, the Supreme
Court has upheld similar laws when attacked on a First Amendment associational
rights basis. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1
(1988).
124. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-102(7)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1995).
125. See, e.g., Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health & Beauty, 516 F.2d 64 (5th Cir.
1975) (women's health spa covered); Anderson v. Pass Christian Isles Golf Club,
Inc., 488 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1974) (golf course covered); Miller v. Amusement En-
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not been applied to retail sales establishments.'26 A retail
store, which would not be covered under the federal act un-
less it served food or provided some sort of entertain-
ment,127 would be covered under the language of the
Arkansas Act. Because the federal act was enacted pursu-
ant to Congress' Commerce Clause power, it is limited to
places that affect commerce or are supported by state ac-
tion.' 28 While the courts have interpreted the Commerce
Clause broadly for purposes of Title 11,129 the Arkansas Act
has no such limitation.
Moreover, the "full enjoyment" language suggests a
broad proscription of discrimination under the state act.
For example, differences in the services given by an estab-
lishment, whether it be in seating patrons in a different or-
der than "first come, first served," or treating them
differently in other aspects of service, arguably are covered
under the "full enjoyment" language. Cases interpreting
similar language under Title II have upheld causes of action
by African-American clientele who were permitted to sit in
a restaurant, but were never served by the attending
waitperson.130 The refusal to serve as well as delayed ser-
vice "are equally condemned by the Civil Rights Act of
1964.''3 In addition, litigants have used the federal act to
attack dual dining areas for African-American and white
patrons. 32 Recently, Denny's restaurants paid a $54 mil-
ters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968) (amusement park covered even though it did
not present live shows); United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp.
474 (E.D. La. 1974) (youth football league covered).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Baird, 865 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Cal. 1994), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 487 (1996).
127. In Baird, two video game machines were enough to transform a conven-
ience store into a place of entertainment for purposes of the Act. Baird, 85 F.3d at
453.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1994).
129. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta.Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
130. Black v. Bonds, 308 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ala. 1969).
131. Id. at 776. See also Bermudez Zenon v. Restaurant Compostela, Inc., 790
F. Supp. 41 (D.P.R. 1992) (plaintiffs kept waiting for three hours while white patrons
were served). But see Robertson v; Burger King, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. La.
1994) (dismissing complaint containing allegations of slow service).
132. United States v. Boyd, 327 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Ga. 1970).
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lion settlement for similar acts of race discrimination. 133
Thus, given the broad interpretation of the federal act and
the even broader language of the Arkansas Act, there is the
potential for a wide variety of lawsuits challenging discrimi-
natory treatment by dining or retail establishments.
The ADA also has public accommodations provisions
protecting persons with disabilities. 34 The ADA is broader
than Title II in the types of establishments it covers 35 and
in what it requires of proprietors of public accommoda-
tions. For example, the ADA prohibits a broad range of
discrimination in public accommodations, 36 and requires
"reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or proce-
dures,' 1  auxiliary aids and services, 38 and the removal of
architectural or communication barriers to help ensure par-
ticipation by individuals with disabilities. 39 Furthermore,
the ADA contains requirements concerning the accessibil-
ity of individuals with disabilities to both newly constructed
and already existing commercial facilities.140 However, the
ADA specifically exempts private clubs, religious organiza-
133. Denny's Chain Is Sued By Black Customers Alleging Race Bias, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 19, 1994, at C15; Benjamin A. Holden, Denny's Chain Settles Suits By Mi-
norities. WALL ST. J., May 24, 1994, at A3.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2) (1994). This section prohibits a broad range of dis-
crimination in public accommodations.
135. The ADA covers places of lodging, establishments serving food or drink,
places of exhibition or entertainment, places of public gathering, sales or rental es-
tablishments, service establishments, transportation stations, places of public display
or collection, places of recreation, places of education, social service establishments,
and places of exercise or recreation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(A)-(L) (1994). In order
for the ADA to apply to an entity covered in this section, that entity's operations
must "affect commerce." Id. For more on the differences in coverage between the
ADA and Title II, see Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Equal Members of the Community":
The Public Accommodations Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64
TEMP. L. REv. 551, 556-59 (1991).
136. 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(1) (1994). Not only does the ADA prohibit discrimi-
nation based on disability in the "full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accom-
modation," but it also sets out specific prohibitions. For a more thorough descrip-
tion of the ADA's coverage, see 42 U.S.C. §12182(a) (1994); Burgdorf, supra note
128, at 559-65.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1994).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (1994).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (1994).
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tions, and entities controlled by religious organizations
from its coverage.141
It is unclear how far the Arkansas Act extends with
respect to accommodations for persons with disabilities.
While the Arkansas Act provides for a right to the "full en-
joyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facili-
ties, or privileges of any place of public resort,
accommodation, assemblage, or amusement[,]' 1 42 it does
not contain the explicit and broad accommodations require-
ments of the ADA. While the right to "full enjoyment" of
public accommodations may be meaningless if, for example,
a person with a disability cannot access the facility due to
the lack of ramps necessary for wheelchairs, it is unclear
whether such modifications of structures are contemplated
under the Arkansas Act. However, given its broad cover-
age of public accommodations, it seems likely that the
ADA would apply to most public facilities in Arkansas. 143
3. Credit and Other Contractual Transactions
In addition to the above-mentioned rights under sec-
tion 107, the Arkansas Act prohibits discrimination in
"credit and other contractual transactions. ' 1 44 Such trans-
actions include purchases on credit at retail stores and re-
lated establishments as well as other types of contractual
agreements, including franchise agreements, sales contracts,
and employment contracts. While the federal Civil Rights
Act of 1866 (hereinafter "section 1981"), makes it illegal in
contracts to discriminate because of race, 45 this section
141. 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1994).
142. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(2) (Supp. 1995).
143. Unlike the ADA, the Arkansas Act has no explicit exemption for religious
organizations and entities controlled by such organizations. The ADA does not di-
rectly apply to housing, although Title III of the ADA, prohibiting discrimination in
public accommodations, may apply to housing. Discrimination based on disability is
covered under federal fair housing laws, which will be discussed in the sections of
this article devoted to the Arkansas Act's fair housing sections. See infra notes 276-
327 and accompanying text.
144. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(4) (Supp. 1995). Credit related to the
purchase of real property should be covered by the Arkansas Fair Housing Act sec-
tions of the Civil Rights Act and will be discussed in the portion of the article cover-
ing that Act. See infra notes 252-303 and accompanying text.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b) (1994).
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does not apply to discrimination based on sex, religion, na-
tional origin or disability. 146 The Arkansas Act, therefore,
is broader by explicitly prohibiting discrimination related to
contracts for all protected classes. 47 Section 1981 applies in
the employment context 148 and explicitly applies to "mak-
ing, performance, modification, and termination of con-
tracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms,
and conditions of the contractual relationship.' 49 Like sec-
tion 1981, the Arkansas Act should apply when an employ-
ment contract is involved. However, it is unclear what it
will take for such a contract to exist and whether the act
will be interpreted as broadly as section 1981. Like the Ar-
kansas Act, section 1981 has no cap on damages for dis-
146. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Von Zuckerstein v. Ar-
gonne Nat'l Lab., 984 F.2d 1467 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993)
(§ 1981 does not apply to national origin discrimination); Vitug v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 860 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. II1. 1994) (§ 1981 does not protect against religious
discrimination); Duncan v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (§ 1981 does not apply to discrimination based on disability). But see Malik v.
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1986), affd, 875 F.2d 307 (2d
Cir..1989) (national origin claim cognizable under § 1981).
147. However, many of the acts that might be prohibited under § 1981, if that
section covered religion, sex, and disability, may be covered by § 1983 if the discrim-
ination is perpetrated under color of state law. Section 1983 generally prohibits any
person "under color of state law" from depriving another of "any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (sexual
harassment claim cognizable under § 1983); Williams v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (maternity leave policy could be
challenged under § 1983-not § 1981).
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994); Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F.
Supp. 933 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd, 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996) (§ 1981 applies to
employment discrimination based on race). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 signifi-
cantly changed the types of employment discrimination covered by § 1981. See Mc-
Knight v. SuperAmerica Group/Ashland Oil Co., 888 F. Supp. 1467 (E.D. Wis.
1995); Hunter v. Citibank, N.A., 862 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 60 F.3d
810, cert. lly Jeffrey A. Blevins & Gregory J. Schroedter, The Civil Rights Act of
1991: Congress Revamps Employment Discrimination Law and Policy, 80 ILL. B.J.
336, 337 (1992); Christopher Payne, Employment Law and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 69 DENV. U. L. REV. 939, 955-58 (1992); Suzanne E. Riley, Comment, Em-
ployees' Retaliation Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Ramifications of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 79 MARO. L. REV. 579 (1996); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act
of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial In-
terpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 938-40 (1993).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994).
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crimination in contracts. 5° Without the damage caps, both
subsection 107(a)(4) of the Arkansas Act and section 1981
offer a significant advantage over both Title VII and the
Arkansas Civil Rights Act's employment sections for those
pursuing employment-related discrimination claims.
4. Voting and Participation in the Political Process
The final protection provided under section 107151
makes it illegal to discriminate with respect to the right to
vote and participate fully in the political process. 52 While
this section would obviously overlap with the governmental
wrongdoing sections of the Arkansas Act, 53 it is not clear
how this might apply in the context of private discrimina-
tion.'54 In addition, such causes of action specifically are
cognizable under federal law when discrimination is based
on "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."'155 Fed-
eral laws also protect individuals with disabilities in this
context.156 Like the federal contractual discrimination pro-
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994) (explicitly exempting those who can recover
under § 1981 from the damage caps applicable under Title VII); Beautford v. Sisters
of Mercy-Province of Detroit, Inc., 816 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 913 (1987) (punitive damages available under § 1981); Mister v. Illinois Cent.
Gulf R.R., 790 F. Supp. 1411 (S.D. Il1. 1992) (compensatory and punitive damages
available under § 1981); Hayden v. Atlanta Newspapers, 534 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D.
Ga. 1982).
151. Subsection 107 also prohibits discrimination in property transactions. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(3) (Supp. 1995). However, because there is now an exten-
sive fair housing act covering property transactions in Arkansas, this section will be
covered in the Arkansas Fair Housing Act section of this article. See infra notes 276-
327 and accompanying text.
152. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(5) (Supp. 1995).
153. See infra notes 213-238 and accompanying text.
154. It is possible, however, to envision a basis for a violation in the private
context. For example, if an employer refuses to give female employees leave to vote
on election day, while giving male employees paid leave to vote, a private employer
could be held liable under the Act for discrimination based on sex.
155. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (1994).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee (1994). In addition, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 prohibits agencies and other entities that receive federal funding from dis-
criminating against individuals with disabilities and requires the entities to provide
reasonable accommodations. 29 C.F.R. § 794 (1996). Because the state office of the
Federal Election Commission in each state receives federal funding, it comes under
the dual mandate of § 504 of nondiscrimination and reasonable accommodations.
See also 11 C.F.R. § 6150 (1996) (covering accessibility); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-57
(1996); 11 C.F.R. § 6151 (1996) (setting out accessibility requirement for new con-
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visions, 57 the federal Voting Rights Act does not apply to
discrimination based on religion, disability, national origin
or sex. 158 However, these forms of discrimination would
likely be covered as an equal protection violation under
section 1983.159
There are two basic types of discrimination recognized
under federal voting rights laws. The first is disenfranchise-
ment or the inability to vote at all. 160 This type of injury
occurs when the government puts restrictions or require-
ments on a person's right to vote such as a poll tax16  or
literacy test. 162 The other form of discrimination is dilution.
This occurs when a certain group's votes count less than the
votes of other voters. 163
There is no reason why both forms of discrimination
should not be encompassed within the Arkansas Act's pro-
scription of discrimination in voting and participation in the
political process. 164
struction). Title II of the ADA may also apply to the accessibility of individuals with
disabilities to polling places.
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (1994).
159. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994) (forbidding New York from drawing school district lines to encompass only
members of a particular religious group); Auerbach v. Kinley, 499 F. Supp. 1329
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) (discriminatory voter registration practices based on status as col-
lege student). But see Thomas C. Berg, Religion, Race, Segregation, and Districting:
Comparing Kiryas Joel With Shaw/Miller, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 365 (1996) (discussing
inconsistencies in the Justices' voting in favor of plaintiffs in race cases versus reli-
gion case); Jeffrey Rosen, Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno: A Text-Bound Interpretivist
Approach, 26 CUMa. L. REV. 387 (1996) (explaining inconsistencies in judicial
voting).
Note, however, that the most active area of voting rights law is in the area of
racial discrimination. See Selwyn Carter, African-American Voting Rights: An His-
torical Struggle, 44 EMORY L.J. 859 (1995).
160. Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the
Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 289 (1995-96).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973h (1994) (specifically authorizing the Attorney General
to institute actions to overturn poll taxes).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1994).
163. See, e.g., Davis v. Brandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See generally Frank R.
Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment. MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION 85 (1984).
164. It is noteworthy that a third type of discrimination was recognized by the
Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 631 (1993). In Shaw, the Court iden-
tified a new equal protection violation in the voting rights area:
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The federal act has a section expressly addressing in-
timidation, threats, or coercion used to interfere with a per-
son's right to vote.165 Similar conduct should be covered
under the retaliation provisions of the Arkansas Act. 166 In
addition, section 5 of the federal act requires any state or
political subdivision that seeks to administer any voting
qualifications to submit them for approval to the United
States Attorney General's office. 67 Arkansas is exempt
from section 5 of the federal act, 68 although is required to
obtain limited preclearance under section 3 of the federal
act. 169 There is no preclearance requirement under the Ar-
kansas Act, although obviously the state and its political
subdivisions must comply with the federal act. There is a
split of authority as to whether the federal act creates a pri-
[A] plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-
neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than
an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and
that the separation lacks sufficient justification.
Id. at 649. Shaw has provoked considerable debate and confusion among both
courts and commentators due to inconsistencies in the way the Justices voted in
Shaw and subsequent cases. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); United
States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995). For a discussion of this debate and related
issues, see Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and
Reality, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 313 (1995-96); Berg, supra note 151; James F. Blumstein,
Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson: Where We Are and Where We Are Headed, 26
CutMB. L. REV. 503 (1995-96); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation By Reli-
gion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 515
(1995-96); Karlan, supra note 152; Frank R. Parker, Factual Errors and Chilling
Consequences: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
527 (1995-96); Rosen, supra note 159. The Supreme Court recently revisited the
issue in Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996), upholding the application of strict
scrutiny to race-based redistricting and rejecting North Carolina's compelling inter-
est arguments. The Court also held that section 5 of the federal act does not require
race-based redistricting.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1994).
166. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-108(b) (Supp. 1995); see infra notes 201-211 and
accompanying text.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). See Scott Gluck, Congressional Reaction to Judi-
cial Construction of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J. OF L. &
Soc. PROB. 337 (1995-96) (discussing the reach of § 5 and congressional reaction to
Court's interpretations of that section).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994); see Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 604-05
(E.D. Ark. 1990) (Eisele, J., dissenting) (describing sections 3 and 5 of the federal
act), appeal dismissed, 498 U.S. 1129 (1991).
169. Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 601-02.
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vate right of action,170 although such violations would be
cognizable as private rights of action under section 1983.'71
The Arkansas Act clearly creates such a right of action. 172
B. Retaliation Provisions
Additional categories of wrongdoing were added to the
Arkansas Civil Rights Act during the 1995 legislative ses-
sion. Along with prohibiting direct acts of discrimination,
the Arkansas Act also expressly prohibits retaliation.
Rather than tracking the language of Title VII, however,
the Arkansas Act tracks the broader language of the ADA.
Specifically, the Act provides that:
No person shall discriminate against any individual be-
cause such individual in good faith has opposed any act
or practice made unlawful by this act or because such
individual in good faith made a charge, testified, as-
sisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this act.173
This language is virtually identical to that of the ADA,
which also prohibits retaliation based on protest activity as
well as participation in the charge process.1 7 1 While Title
VII prohibits similar actions, its language is more limited. 75
Instead of applying to a "person," it applies to retaliation
by an "employer" against "any of his employees or appli-
cants for employment. ' 176  This difference is significant.
The Arkansas Act clearly provides a cause of action to
those outside of the employment relationship.177
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1994) (giving attorney general ability to institute
suit under the Act); Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1985) (no private
right of action for violations of Voting Rights Act); Good v. Roy, 459 F. Supp. 403
(D. Kan. 1978) (no private right of action for violation of Voting Rights Act).
171. See Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995), certified question an-
swered, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 276 (1995).
172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 1995).
173. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-123-110(a) (Supp. 1995).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1994).
175. See Richards, supra note 5, at 89.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
177. The Supreme Court has recently interpreted the language of Title VII in a
broad manner, making it applicable to acts of retaliation perpetuated against former
employees. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
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The Arkansas Act contains another retaliation section
that similarly applies to "persons" rather than employers.
The Act states:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoy-
ment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or
enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or
encouraged any other individual in the exercise or en-joyment of, any right granted or protected by this act.178
This provision is almost identical to that of the
ADA;179 however, Title VII does not contain similar lan-
guage. This section of the Arkansas Act should provide a
cause of action to any person, even though not employed by
the particular company involved, who is threatened for en-
couraging an employee to pursue a discrimination claim
against his employer.
These provisions go beyond employment discrimina-
tion-related activities and also encompass all rights guaran-
teed under the Arkansas Act, including sections involving
public accommodations, property transactions, credit and
other contractual transactions, and participation in the
political process. This section also should apply to the
housing discrimination sections of the Act (a description of
which follows) because the fair housing sections of the Ar-
kansas Act likewise declare the "opportunity to obtain
housing and other real estate" without discrimination a
"civil right. '180
C. Remedies for Discrimination Under Section 107
The Arkansas Act distinguishes between remedies
available for the general categories of discrimination and
those available for employment discrimination. Essentially,
the distinction in the employment discrimination context
comes down to the difference between intentional discrimi-
nation and other forms of discrimination.'81 This reflects
178. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-108(b) (Supp. 1995).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (1994).
180. ARK.CODE ANN. § 16-123-203 (Supp. 1995).
181. This reflects an implicit acknowledgment of federal cases (and now legisla-
tion) holding that employment discrimination need not be intentional to violate Ti-
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the legislature's understanding and adoption of the dispa-
rate impact theory of employment discrimination that has
been developed by the courts and acknowledged by Con-
gress under Title VII.182
For non-employment related forms of discrimination,
the Act provides that:
Any person who is injured by an intentional act of dis-
crimination [with respect to all rights except employ-
ment] . . . shall have a civil action in a court of
competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, to
recover compensatory and punitive damages, and, in
the discretion of the court, to recover the cost of litiga-
tion and a reasonable attorney's fee." 3
Compensatory damages are defined as "damages for
mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible inju-
ries," but explicitly do not include punitive damages. 184
While the Arkansas Act leaves costs and attorney's fees
within the discretion of the trial court, it should be noted
that the federal courts have interpreted similar language
applicable to Title VII to essentially require attorney's fees
awards to prevailing plaintiffs.8 5 Unlike the employment
sections, there is no cap on the amount of damages allowed
for discrimination covered by this section.
In cases of employment discrimination, a person
shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, which may issue an order prohibiting the discrimi-
natory practices and provide affirmative relief from the
effects of the practices, and award back pay, interest on
tie VII. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(1994) (codifying disparate impact analysis). But see United States v. North Caro-
lina, 914 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding Griggs implicitly overruled to the
extent it permits claims without intent). See also David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993) (arguing that many forms of
discrimination are so inbred as to only give rise to a claim of negligent rather than
intentional discrimination).
182. See Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994) But see
United States v. North Carolina, 914 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
183. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(b) (Supp. 1995).
184. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(2) (Supp. 1995).
185. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978). Several
recent Eighth Circuit cases have limited the concept of prevailing party under Title
VII and have denied attorney's fees on that basis. See, e.g., Pedigo v. P.A.M. Trans-
port, Inc., 98 F.3d 396, 397-98 (8th Cir. 1996).
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back pay, and, in the discretion of the court, the cost of
litigation and a reasonable attorney's fee. 186
This section provides the only relief'8 7 for disparate impact
discrimination, which requires no showing of intent. 88
Under the Supreme Court's analysis of Title VII prior to
the addition of compensatory and punitive damages by the
federal Civil Rights Act of 1991, a plaintiff was entitled to
back pay earned from the date of discharge to the date of
reinstatement (or front pay, if no reinstatement was or-
dered), 18 9 and lost fringe benefits, such as vacation and pen-
sion benefits. 90 There is no reason to believe that this
section of the Arkansas Act contemplates different types of
relief. Under the Arkansas Act, back pay is limited to two
years prior to the filing of an action.19'
In addition, for acts of "intentional discrimination," the
plaintiff in an employment discrimination case can recover
compensatory and punitive damages, 192 but unlike other
types of discriminatory acts covered by section 107 of the
Arkansas Act, there are caps on the amount of compensa-
tory and punitive damages available in the employment dis-
crimination context. 93 The caps are as follows: (1) $15,000
for employers of fewer than fifteen; (2) $50,000 for employ-
ers of more than fourteen and fewer than 101; (3) $100,000
for employers of more than 100 and fewer than 201; (4)
$200,000 for employers of more than 200 and fewer than
186. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 1995).
187. I use the term "relief' here because such awards are considered equitable
in nature for purposes of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994) (character-
izing backpay as equitable); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 768 n.27
(1976) (characterizing lost benefits and retroactive seniority as restitution).
188. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-33.
189. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 239 n.9 (1992) (acknowledging
use of front pay in lieu of reinstatement); Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815,
822 (5th Cir. 1990) (front pay awarded where reinstatement not feasible).
190. Burke, 504 U.S. at 239.
191. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 1995).
192. The characterization of such awards as compensatory "damages" supports a
reading of the forms of relief available under ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-
107(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 1995), such as backpay and lost benefits, as consistent with Title
VII. See Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Management, 72 F.3d 1228, 1233 (6th
Cir. 1996). Therefore, it would seem likely that awards of backpay, attorney's fees
and the like would be considered equitable in nature and therefore subject to suit in
chancery court rather than circuit court.
193. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1995).
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501; (5) $300,000 for employers of more than 500.19 These
are identical to the caps set under Title VII and for employ-
ment discrimination under the ADA.195 For employment
discrimination under the state Act, the action must be
brought within one year of the alleged discrimination or
within ninety days of receipt of a right to sue letter or deter-
mination from the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (hereinafter "EEOC"), whichever is later.196 This
gives the potential plaintiff a significant extension of time
compared to Title VII and the ADA197 in which to file
claims. Under Title VII and the ADA, the employee in Ar-
kansas must file her charge with the EEOC within 180 days
of the alleged discriminatory act.198
In addition, the provisions regarding retaliation refer
back to the employment discrimination provisions for pur-
poses of damages. 199 The remedies and procedures for vio-
lation of the retaliation provisions are the same as those
available under section 106, namely, a civil action to enjoin
further violation, to recover compensatory and punitive
damages, and, in the discretion of the court, to recover costs
and attorney's fees.2°°
D. Coverage for Hate Crimes Under Section 106
Closely related to discrimination, section 106 of the
Arkansas Act (hereinafter "section 106") covers damages
and injunctive relief available to victims of "hate offenses."
Specifically, it states that:
An action for injunctive relief or civil damages, or both,
shall lie for any person who is subjected to acts of:
(1) Intimidation or harassment; or
(2) Violence directed against his person; or
194. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1995).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3) (1994); Hogan v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 61 F.3d
1034 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying damage caps in ADA context).
196. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(c)(3) (Supp. 1995).
197. The ADA requires a plaintiff to follow the same procedures as are followed
under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994).
199. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-108(c) (Supp. 1995).
200. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-108(c) (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-
107 (Supp. 1995).
1997] 195
196 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:165
(3) Vandalism directed against his real or personal
property, where such acts are motivated by racial, reli-
gious, or ethnic animosity.20 1
While other provisions of the Act explicitly apply to gender
discrimination, the hate crimes section does not. 2  There is
no federal act aimed at hate crimes in particular,0 3 except
for violence based on gender.0 4
Similar hate crimes statutes have come under constitu-
tional attack as First Amendment violations. 5 Sections 2
201. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-106(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1995).
202. The federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)
(1994), requires the United States Attorney General to keep statistics regarding hate
crimes motivated by race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, and ethnicity. It
does not include gender. Commentators have argued that gender-based illegal acts
should be counted as hate crimes. Marguerite Angelari, Hate Crimes Statutes: A
Promising Tool for Fighting Violence against Women, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 63
(1994); Elizabeth A. Pendo, Recognizing Violence Against Women: Gender and the
Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 157 (1994); Eric Rothschild,
Recognizing Another Face of Hate Crimes: Rape as a Gender-Bias Crime, 4 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 231 (1993). These commentators got their wish in 1994,
with the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
However, recently a defendant successfully attacked the Act on constitutional
grounds, arguing that Congress acted beyond its authority under the Commerce
Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in creating the statute. Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996). If this anal-
ysis holds up on appeal, there will be no relief under federal law for violence aimed
at women. This makes the enactment of state statutes covering violence directed
against women all the more important.
203. Hate crimes are encompassed within various civil rights statutes. See 18
U.S.C. § 241 (1994) (prohibiting conspiracies designed to interfere with a person's
enjoyment of his or her civil rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (covering deprivation of
civil rights under color of state law); 18 U.S.C. § 247 (1994) (making it illegal to
deface, damage, or destroy any religious real property because of its religious func-
tion as well as to obstruct by force or threat of force a person's enjoyment of his or
her right to freedom of religion); 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994) (forbidding interference
with the exercise of fair housing rights). In addition, the federal sentencing guide-
lines provide for a heightened punishment under appropriate circumstances for
criminal activities motivated by "race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gen-
der, disability, or sexual orientation." U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(a).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); but see note 203.
205. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). Both these Supreme Court cases raised the First Amend-
ment issue in the context of criminal prosecutions. In R.A.V., the Court held that a
city ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated disorderly conduct facially invalid under
the First Amendment because it prohibited speech solely based on content. R.A.V.,
505 U.S. at 381, 391-92. Mitchell considered the constitutionality of sentence en-
hancements for racially motivated criminal acts. The Court held a Wisconsin statute
constitutional under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it prohib-
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and 3 of the Arkansas Act would likely withstand such a
challenge. The First Amendment generally does not cover
conduct, even if it has expressive content.2 °6 The United
States Supreme Court has held that physical assault is con-
duct and not speech protected by the First Amendment.0 7
This holding would clearly encompass violations of section
2 of the Arkansas Act-violence directed against a per-
son.20 8 By analogy, it should also cover section 3, as vandal-
ism likewise is conduct that does not have a First
Amendment component.20 9 It is unclear whether the intim-
idation and harassment section would withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny. Certainly if the conduct amounts to an
assault, it will be the type of conduct unprotected by the
First Amendment. However, the vague nature of the acts
covered by this section makes it problematic.
The hate crimes section provides that any party who
prevails in an action under this section "shall be entitled to
damages, including punitive damages, and in the discretion
of the court to an award of the cost of the litigation, and a
reasonable attorney's fee in an amount to be fixed by the
court. '2 10 This language makes damages, and specifically
punitive damages, mandatory. Unlike the recovery avail-
able for discriminatory acts covered by section 107, it also
mandates attorney's fees and costs as opposed to making
them discretionary. In addition, unlike the employment
discrimination provision, there is no cap on punitive dam-
ages awarded for hate crimes. Obviously, this section has
more teeth than section 107. However, employees and
other potential defendants under section 107 should not
rest easy. It seems reasonable that if an employer subjects
ited conduct not protected by the First Amendment. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488-90.
For more on the First Amendment and hate crimes, see Craig Peyton Gaumer. Pun-
ishment for Prejudice: A Commentary on the Constitutionality and Utility of State
Statutory Responses to the Problem of Hate Crimes, 39 S.D. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5 (1994).
206. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 138-39 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (racially
based violent acts may be illegal under Fair Housing Act).
209. See Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 123 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (firebombing
home); Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. at 138-39 (property damage); Stackhouse v.
DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 210-11 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (firebombing car).
210. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-106(b) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
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an employee to actions that fit within this part of the stat-
ute-the acts rise to the level of hate crimes-that em-
ployer would not be able to take advantage of the cap on
damages. Harassment based on these characteristics should
fit within this section of the statute. This section does ex-
cept speech covered by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution or article 2, section 6 of the Arkansas
Constitution.211
E. Governmental Section: Wrongful Conduct
Under "Color" of Law
There is a section of the Arkansas Act that expressly
applies to the violation of rights by governmental actors. It
functions essentially as the state equivalent to the federal
section 1983.212 This section used to apply to "[e]very gov-
ernmental entity or natural person. ' 213 During the 1995
legislative session, the statute was changed slightly and now
reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of this state or any
of its political subdivisions, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Arkansas Constitution, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, a suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.214
The new provision also limited protection to "any person
within the jurisdiction thereof." Thus, persons outside the
jurisdictional reach of Arkansas courts cannot sue under
211. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-106(c) (Supp. 1995).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Indeed, the two statutes have very similar lan-
guage. Section 1983 provides that
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any state or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
213. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(a) (Supp. 1995).
214. Act of Feb. 28, 1995, No. 480, § 2, 1995 Ark. Acts (codified as amended
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(a) (Supp. 1995)).
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the statute. This section allows the court, in its discretion,
to require the "party held liable" for costs of litigation and
attorney's fees.21 5
This section explicitly states that the courts should look
to cases interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter "section
1983") as of January 1, 1993, to construe the Arkansas
Act.216 It is noteworthy that section 1983, like the state stat-
ute, provides for discretionary attorney's fees, which, like
those under Title VII, have become essentially a mandatory
award for prevailing plaintiffs.217 Section 1983 applies to a
wide range of governmental conduct, including prisoner's
rights cases,218 the exercise of First Amendment rights, 219
and employment discrimination.22° This suggests a broad
array of applications for the state act. However, decisions
under section 1983 are given only persuasive authority for
purposes of the Arkansas Act.221
One federal court has had occasion to engage in lim-
ited interpretation of this section. In Morrow v. City of
Jacksonville,222 the court noted the limited application of
this section to deprivations of "rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Arkansas Constitution. ' 223 The plain-
tiff alleged employment discrimination based on her
disability. Although the court was brief in its reasoning, ap-
parently it found no support for such a claim under the Ar-
kansas Constitution. This case highlights a significant
distinction between the Arkansas Act and the federal
§ 1983. The federal act applies not only to constitutional
215. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(a) (Supp. 1995).
216. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(c) (Supp. 1995).
217. See Christiansburg Garment Co. Y. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
218. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (involuntary commitment of
prisoner to mental hospital).
219. See, e.g., Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 1270 (3d Cir. 1994).
220. See Maura L. DeMouy, Recent Decisions-Employment Law: Exploring the
Boundaries of Section 1983 and Title VII, 54 MD. L. REv. 942 (1995).
221. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(c) (Supp. 1995). For a discussion of recent
developments under § 1983, see Charles Matthew Bums, Recent Development: Sec-
tion 1983, 24 STETSON L. REV. 611 (1995); DeMouy, supra note 220; Martin A.
Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation, 12 TouRo L. REv. 237 (1996).
222. 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
223. Id. at 820 n.2 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-103 (Supp. 1995)).
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deprivations but also to any arising under "the laws. '224
Therefore, the federal act's coverage is broader and encom-
passes violations based on federal anti-discrimination
laws.225 The Arkansas Act only covers deprivations of
rights guaranteed under the Arkansas Constitution. This is
a significant limitation.
The Arkansas Act is somewhat confusing, because it
creates a cause of action against governmental actors, while
at the same time it provides for sovereign immunity for the
state. Section 16-123-104 states that "[n]othing in this sub-
chapter shall be construed to waive the sovereign immunity
of the State of Arkansas. ' 226 This apparently means that
the Civil Rights Act does not apply to the state. However,
there seems to be no reason why the Arkansas Act could
not be used against individuals acting in their "individual"
capacities, through the reasoning of Ex parte Young.227
Young limits a potential plaintiff to injunctive and declara-
tory relief,228 along with other forms of incidental relief,
such as attorney's fees.229
The Arkansas courts have similarly held that a request
for declaratory or injunctive relief that does not have an
impact on the state treasury is not a claim against the state
for purposes of sovereign immunity.230 However, it is not
clear whether relief characterized as "incidental" by the
federal courts will be considered similarly by the Arkansas
courts. Indeed, precedent thus far suggests that it is un-
224. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
225. See Morrow, 941 F. Supp. at 826.
226. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-104 (Supp. 1995). Instead, the state Claims
Commission has "exclusive jurisdiction over all claims against the State of Arkan-
sas." ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-204(a) (Supp. 1995).
227. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Young, the Court engaged in a legal fiction, reason-
ing that Minnesota's Attorney General was not acting in his "official" capacity when
he sought to enforce the state's laws that were unconstitutional. The reasoning of
the Court was that a state official does not act in his or her official capacity when he
or she seeks to enforce an unconstitutional act. The state would only sanction con-
stitutional actions, and therefore the lawsuit could not be considered one against the
state. Id. at 168. See Commission on Judicial Discipline and Disability v. Digby, 792
S.W.2d 594 (Ark. 1990).
228. Young, 209 U.S. at 162-63.
229. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
230. Digby, 792 S.W.2d at 595; Cammack v. Chalmers, 680 S.W.2d 689 (Ark.
1984).
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likely that any sort of monetary relief against the state
would be attainable.231 The legislature's inclusion of section
1983 case law as persuasive authority for the Arkansas Act
supports this conclusion, as the doctrine of Young was de-
veloped prior to 1993 in the section 1983 context.232 Legis-
lation enacted in 1981 provides for tort remedies against
state employees to the extent they are covered by liability
insurance,233 although several cases decided in the 1980s
have caused some confusion with respect to this legisla-
tion's operation.234 In addition, state employees are not im-
mune from suit to the extent they act maliciously.235
Finally, the legislature is limited by the Arkansas Con-
stitution, which explicitly provides for the sovereign immu-
nity of the state.236 Arguably, the legislature could not
abrogate sovereign immunity even if it wished to without a
constitutional amendment, as sovereign immunity is guar-
anteed under the Arkansas Constitution.237 With this ex-
press limitation on actions against the state, the most
significant area of applicability for this section will likely be
against political subdivisions and other official actors who
do not act on behalf of the State of Arkansas. However,
political subdivisions have been granted immunity in cer-
tain contexts by the legislature.238
231. See Digby, 792 S.W.2d at 595 (plaintiff dropped claim for costs and ex-
penses apparently to avoid sovereign immunity claim).
232. Young, 209 U.S. at 123; Digby, 792 S.W.2d at 594.
233. ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-305(a) (1987); Smith v. Denton, 895 S.W.2d 550
(Ark. 1995).
234. See Lisa D. Tobin, Note, Bly v. Young, Beaulieu v. Gray, and Carter v.
Bush: The Arkansas State Employee Immunity Trilogy, 41 ARK. L. REV. 893 (1988).
235. Bland v. Veser, 774 S.W.2d 124 (Ark. 1989); Beaulieu v. Gray, 705 S.W.2d
880 (Ark. 1986).
236. ARK. CONsT. art. 5, § 20 ("The State of Arkansas shall never be made de-
fendant in any of her courts."). See Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Lasley, 390
S.W.2d 443 (Ark. 1965).
237. Roesler v. Denton, 390 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Ark. 1965); Bryant v. Arkansas State
Highway Comm'n, 342 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ark. 1961).
238. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-301 (Repl. 1996). This section explicitly states:
"Counties, municipal corporations, school districts, special improvement districts,
and all other political subdivisions of the state shall be immune from liability and
from suits for damages, except to the extent that they may be covered by liability
insurance." Id. These provisions have withstood constitutional attack. See Thomp-
son v. Sanford, 663 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Ark. 1984) (holding that statutes "granting
political subdivison immunity ... are legal"); Hardin v. City of Devalls Bluff, 508
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F. Express Exceptions to the Act's Coverage
There are several broad categories of exemption from
the Arkansas Act's coverage under these sections. They
cover four main areas: (1) religious entities; (2) non-dis-
criminatory actions; (3) insurance-related practices; and (4)
state actors. Because these are categories of exemption,
they are likely to be considered affirmative defenses, with
the burden of proof placed on the employer.239 In addition,
there are exemptions available under parallel federal laws
that may make the Arkansas Act a more attractive alterna-
tive for plaintiffs.
With respect to religious institutions, the provisions of
the Arkansas Act that relate to employment discrimination
do not apply to "employment by a religious corporation,
association, society, or other religious entity. ' 240 There is a
similar exemption under Title VII.241 The ADA likewise
S.W.2d 559 (Ark. 1974) (legislative enactments granting counties, municipal corpo-
rations, and other political subdivisions immunity from tort liability are constitu-
tional). One of the few cases interpreting the Arkansas Act actually deals with an
attempt to gain sovereign immunity by a local utility company. Masterson v.
Stambuck, 902 S.W.2d 803 (Ark. 1995), involved a fatal car crash between a garbage
truck and car. Three persons died as a result of the accident. The garbage truck hit
a utility pole, which broke in two and hit the cab of the truck. Along with the driver,
the plaintiffs sued Conway Corporation for negligently maintaining the pole too
close to the highway. Conway Corporation responded by claiming governmental
and charitable immunity. Apparently, the claim of governmental immunity lead to
one of the plaintiff's estates claiming a violation of the governmental entity section
of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(a) (Supp. 1995).
The estate alleged that Conway Corporation had deprived the deceased of his life.
Conway Corporation moved to dismiss this claim, arguing that the Arkansas Act did
not apply under such circumstances. In granting the motion to dismiss, the Court
did not directly address the Civil Rights Act, holding instead that Conway Corpora-
tion is not entitled to governmental immunity and is not entitled to charitable immu-
nity. This suggests a more limited approach to entities trying to tag on state
sovereign immunity because of a loose affiliation with a governmental entity. Mas-
terson, 902 S.W.2d at 810-11.
239. See Walker v. Walker, 791 S.W.2d 710, 710-11 (Ark. 1990) (holding that
statutory exemption from garnishment is an affirmative defense under Arkansas
law). See generally Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); Jackson v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1013 (11th Cir. 1982); Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 448 (D.C Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)
(all considering exemptions under Title VII an affirmative defense).
240. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-103(a) (Supp. 1995).
241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994). There is an additional exemption for religious
educational institutions under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
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contains a provision relating to religious entities, although it
is different.242 It provides that the ADA "shall not prohibit
a religious corporation, association, educational institution,
or society from giving preference in employment to individ-
uals of a particular religion to perform work connected with
the carrying on by such corporation, association, educa-
tional institution, or society of its activities. ' '24 3 The ADA
also permits religious entities to require employees to "con-
form to the religious tenets of such organization."2 44
In addition, employers need not accommodate reli-
gious practices of an employee or prospective employee if
"the employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
make such accommodation without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer's business. '245 This parallels the
language of Title VII.246 The courts have interpreted this
language in Title VII to impose a less than "de minimis"
cost in accommodating the employee's religious beliefs.247
If the burden is more than de minimis, the employer need
not accommodate the employee's belief. Given the similar
language in both the Arkansas Act and Title VII, Arkansas
courts may interpret the state act similarly.
Defendants are not liable under the Arkansas Act if
they can show that their "actions were based on legitimate,
nondiscriminatory factors and not on unjustified rea-
sons."248 This applies to all aspects of discrimination cov-
ered by the Act.249 This language is somewhat confusing.
While the federal courts have interpreted Title VII as shift-
242. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c) (1994).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)(1) (1994).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)(2) (1994). The ADA also exempts the government of
the United States or Indian tribe from its employment discrimination coverage. 42
U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(I) (1994). The United States, however, is covered by the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-94 (1994). In enacting the ADA,
Congress reaffirmed its commitment to antidiscrimination in employment based on
an individual's "state of physical handicap." 42 U.S.C. § 12209(a)(1) (1994).
245. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-103(b) (Supp. 1995).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
247. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986).
248. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-103(c) (Supp. 1995),
249. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-23-103(c) (Supp. 1995). Sub-sections (a) and (b) of
this exemption section apply only to employment discrimination. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-23-103(a), (b) (Supp. 1995).
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ing a burden of production on employers to show that they
were motivated by a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son, 250 this appears to shift the burden of persuasion under
the Arkansas Act. In addition, this language suggests that
only a legitimate business reason provides an exemption.
So if an employer has what might be characterized as an
irrational or "illegitimate" reason-such as an employee's
zodiac sign-for taking an adverse employment action, that
employer's action arguably does not fall within the exemp-
tion. The result, if this analysis is accurate, could essentially
amount to abrogation of the at-will rule in Arkansas. It is
very unlikely that this is what the legislature intended given
Arkansas' fierce defense of employment at-will,25' but the
issue remains for the courts' interpretation. Perhaps this
section is meant as a gap-filler for other legitimate reasons
for distinguishing between employees that are not expressly
set out in the Arkansas Act.
The Arkansas Act is missing several exemptions that
are contained in Title VII. Notably, Title VII provides an
exemption for bona fide occupational qualifications252 as
well as bona fide seniority or merit systems. 3 Differences
250. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
251. See Griffin v. Erickson, 642 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Ark. 1982) (affirming the at-
will rule in Arkansas). After M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980), it
seemed that the Arkansas Supreme Court had recognized a public policy exception
to employment at-will. See Mark L. Martin, Wrongful Discharge of Employees Ter-
minable at Will-A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L. REV. 729
(1980). However, only rarely has the court held that a public policy was violated
such that employment at-will did not apply. Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Baysinger, 812 S.W.2d
463 (Ark. 1991); Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 812 S.W.2d 483 (Ark. 1991); Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988). The public policy exception recognized
in the worker's compensation context in both Wal-Mart and Mapco was later legisla-
tively overruled. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(d) (1996) ("This section shall not be
construed as establishing an exception to the employment at will doctrine."). For an
analysis of these cases and the legislature's reaction to them, see J. Thomas Sullivan,
The Arkansas Remedy for Employer Retaliation Against Workers' Compensation
Claimants, 16 U. ARK. LririLE ROCK L.J. 373 (1994). The majority of cases have
held that no public policy was violated. See Cross v. Coffman, 805 S.W.2d 44 (Ark.
1991); Proctor v. East Cent. Ark. EOC, 724 S.W.2d 163 (Ark. 1987); Newton v.
Brown & Root, 658 S.W.2d 370 (Ark. 1983); Counce, 596 S.W.2d at 683-84;
Koenighain v. Schilling Motors, Inc., 811 S.W.2d 342 (Ark. App. 1991).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994). Title VII also provides an exemption for
certain positions involving national security and for businesses on or near Indian
reservations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g), 2(I) (1994).
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between employees based on seniority or objective merit
(for example, the amount of sales last year) would normally
provide a legitimate reason to differentiate between, for ex-
ample, a candidate for promotion. These defenses should
fit within the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors" ex-
emption discussed above. If they fall within this exemption,
they will constitute affirmative defenses, which is consistent
with federal law.
The Arkansas Act may not be intended to contain a
bona fide occupational qualification (hereinafter "BFOQ")
defense for employers. The BFOQ defense has been of de-
creased use to employers as a defense under Title VII be-
cause of the narrow reading the courts have given it.2 5 4
Therefore, the state simply could have chosen not to in-
clude this defense because it is of limited applicability. For
the few employers who would have the defense available to
them under Title VII, the Arkansas Act may not provide
the same defense. 5
The Arkansas Act also contains insurance-related pro-
visions that protect certain types of organizations from dis-
crimination claims in specific contexts. These provisions
state:
Provided the conduct at issue is based on a bona fide
business judgment and is not a pretext for prohibited
discrimination, nothing in this subchapter shall be con-
strued to prohibit or restrict:
(1) An insurer, hospital, medical service company,
health maintenance organization, or any agent or entity
that administers benefit plans, or any bank, savings and
loan, or other lender from underwriting insurance or
lending risks or administering such risks that are based
on or are not inconsistent with federal or state law;
(2) A person covered by this subchapter from establish-
ing, sponsoring, observing, or administering the terms
of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwrit-
ing risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks
that are based on or are not inconsistent with federal or
state law; or
254. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991).
255. See Richards, supra note 5, at 90.
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(3) A person covered by this subchapter from establish-
ing, sponsoring, observing, or administering the terms
of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to federal
or state laws that regulate insurance.256
This language is nearly identical to a similar provision in the
ADA, with two notable exceptions.257 First, it adds lan-
guage in section one regarding lenders who underwrite in-
surance or lending risks that is not contained in the parallel
section of the ADA. Second, the Arkansas Act contains
the preamble language: "Provided the conduct at issue is
based on a bona fide business judgment and is not a pretext
for prohibited discrimination," which is not present in the
ADA. 8
The language in sub-sections (1) and (2) limiting the
exemptions to the extent they are "not inconsistent with
federal law" greatly diminishes their reach. Under Title
VII, employers cannot discriminate, for example, in pen-
sion pay-outs because women statistically live longer than
men.25 9 Generally, the plan must be employer-sponsored to
be covered by Title VII.260 Title VII also applies to employ-
ers' discriminatory practices involving insurance.261 For ex-
ample, in Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v.
Manhart, the employer was held guilty of discrimination be-
cause it made women, based on life expectancy, pay more
into a pension plan than men.262 In Arizona Governing
Committee v. Norris, the employer was held guilty of dis-
crimination for paying less in pension benefits to women
because of their alleged longer life expectancy. The plan in
that case was managed by an outside insurer who set the
rules governing payment. However, this did not insulate
the employer because it picked the plan. Therefore, it is
clear that just because an employer's practice involves in-
256. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-103(d)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1995).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
258. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-103(d) (Supp. 1995); 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)
(1994).
259. Los Angeles Dep't. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
260. Arizona Governing Comm'n. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
261. See Norris, 463 U.S. 1073; Manhart, 435 U.S. 702.
262. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722-23.
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surance, the employer cannot entirely avoid liability under
either Title VII or the Arkansas Act.
The ADA also prohibits discrimination in insurance
practices.263 However, it contains nearly identical insurance
exemptions, as explained above, to those of the Arkansas
Act. This suggests that the Arkansas Act's insurance ex-
emption should have some application in the context of dis-
ability discrimination. An insurance or benefit plan that
meets the ADA insurance exemption will not violate fed-
eral law.264 Therefore, the Arkansas Act's insurance ex-
emption should relieve an employer of liability to the
extent it satisfies the ADA exemption.
The insurance exemption is also applicable to other
provisions of the Arkansas Act.265 In particular, it should
be applicable to the public accommodations portion of the
Act. Once again, however, federal courts have limited dis-
crimination in insurance allowable under the ADA. Fed-
eral courts have held that discrimination in insurance based
on disability can violate the public accommodations provi-
sions of the ADA in spite of the insurance exemption.266
Give the similarity between the Arkansas Act's public ac-
commodation provision and those of the ADA, the insur-
ance section may provide only limited exemption for those
discriminating in furnishing insurance.267
There is another reason why this section is curious. By
its language, the Arkansas Act does not apply to terms,
conditions or privileges of employment. Employer-spon-
sored benefit plans are terms or conditions of employment.
While the insurance exemption may be applicable to the
public accommodations provision, insurance and benefits
263. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6(a)-(b) (1996).
264. For more on the ADA's insurance exemption and its reach, see EQUAL EM-
PLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDE ON APPLI-
CATION OF ADA TO HEALTH INSURANCE (June 8, 1993), reprinted in, Fair Empl.
Prac. Manual 405:7115 (BNA).
265. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-103(d)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1995).
266. See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New
England, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp.
1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
267. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) (ADA public accommodation provi-
sion) with ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(2) (Supp. 1995).
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do not directly relate to the right to obtain and hold em-
ployment.268 Therefore, it is not clear why this section is
needed, unless the Arkansas Act is actually meant to be
broader than its plain language. Considering the limitation
based on federal law, to the extent it does establish an "ex-
emption," it does not appear to be a very meaningful one
except in the disability context.
In addition, the Arkansas Act states that "[t]his sub-
chapter shall not apply to matters regulated by the Arkan-
sas Insurance Code or the Trade Practices Act of the
Arkansas Insurance Code .... ",269 The practical effect of
the Insurance Code exemption is not entirely clear. The
Arkansas Act already contains insurance exemptions.
Also, there are anti-discrimination sections in the Trade
Practices Act. The Trade Practices Act prohibits any per-
son in the business of insurance from engaging in certain
acts of "unfair discrimination, ' '270 which includes refusing to
268. A possible loophole to classify such employer policies as discriminatory
would be proof showing the fringe benefits were so disparate as to cause a certain
group to quit their jobs. See supra text accompanying notes 105-109.
269. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-103(e) (Supp. 1995).
270. The Trade Practices Act is fairly sweeping in the conduct it prohibits,
including:
(A) Making or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals of
the same class and equal expectation of life in the rates charged for any
contract of life insurance or of life annuity or in the dividends or other
benefits payable thereon, or in any other of the terms and conditions of
such contract;
(B) [m]aking or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals
of the same class and of essentially the same hazard in the amount of pre-
mium policy fees or rates charged for any policy or contract of disability
insurance, or in the benefits payable thereunder, or in any of the terms or
conditions of the contract, or in any other manner whatever;
(C) [m]aking or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals
or risks of the same class and of essentially the same hazards by refusing to
issue, refusing to renew, canceling, or limiting the amount of insurance cov-
erage on a property or casualty risk because of the geographic location of
the risk ......
(D) [m]aking or permitting any unfair discrimination between individuals
or risks of the same class and of essentially the same hazards by refusing to
issue, refusing to renew, canceling, or limiting the amount of insurance cov-
erage on a residential property risk or on the personal property contained
therein because of the age of the residential property .... ;
(E) refusing to insure, refusing to continue to insure, or limiting the
amount of coverage available to an individual because of the marital status
of the individual.... ;
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insure or to continue to insure someone based on disabil-
ity, 271 race, color, creed or sex.272
One possible difference this exemption might make in-
volves who may pursue violations. It is unclear whether
there is a private right of action under the Trade Practices
Act. Section 23-66-202 states that the Arkansas Act is
meant to "regulate trade practices in the business of insur-
ance." 273 However, it explicitly states that "no provisions of
this subchapter are intended to establish or extinguish a pri-
vate right of action for a violation of any provision of this
subchapter. '274 Therefore, there is no private right of ac-
tion under the Trade Practices Act. This section presuma-
bly would apply to any causes of action existing at the time
of its enactment. In that case, because the Trade Practices
Act was enacted in 1947, it predates the Civil Rights Act.
Therefore, it arguably could not preserve any claims avail-
able under the Arkansas Act. Adding to the confusion is
section 23-66-204, which states that "[t]he powers vested in
the commissioner by this subchapter shall be additional to
any other powers to enforce any penalties, fines, or forfeit-
ures authorized by law with respect to the methods, acts,
and practices declared to be unfair or deceptive. 275 This
suggests that only the insurance commissioner possesses
power to enforce this statute. For actions falling within the
Trade Practices Act, this could provide a meaningful
exception.
G. Housing Discrimination
One of the most impressive sections contained in the
Arkansas Act is its sweeping proscription of housing dis-
crimination. While the 1993 version of the Arkansas Act
(F) [t]erminating or modifying coverage or refusing to issue or refusing to
renew any policy or contract of insurance solely because the applicant or
insured or any employee of either is mentally or physically impaired.... ;
(G) [rjefusing to insure or continue to insure any individual or risks solely
because of race, color, creed or sex.
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-66-206(7)(A)-(G) (Supp. 1995).
271. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-206(7)(F) (Supp. 1995).
272. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-66-206(7)(A)-(G) (Supp. 1995).
273. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-202(a) (Repl. 1994).
274. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-202(b) (Repl. 1994).
275. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-204 (Repl. 1994).
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prohibited discrimination in property transactions as well as
in credit and other contractual transactions,276 a provision
was added to the Civil Rights Act during the 1995 legisla-
tive session explicitly covering fair housing-the Arkansas
Fair Housing Act (hereinafter "AFHA").277 The AFHA
declares the right to obtain "housing and other real estate
without discrimination because of religion, race, color, na-
tional origin, sex, disability,278 or familial status "279 a civil
right. This law has two meaningful additions to its cover-
age. Unlike other sections of the Civil Rights Act, the
AFHA covers "familial status" (though not expressly de-
fined), as well as discrimination based on the status of
cohabitants.280
The AFHA specifically prohibits a broad range of dis-
criminatory actions:
(a) A person engaging in a real estate transaction, or a
real estate broker or salesman shall not [on a basis
prohibited]....
(1) Refuse to engage in a real estate transaction with a
person;
(2) Discriminate against a person in the terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of a real estate transaction or in the
furnishing of facilities or services in the connection
therewith;
(3) Refuse to receive from a person or transmit to a per-
son a bona fide offer to engage in a real estate
transaction;
276. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(3)-(4) (Supp. 1995).
277. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-201 (Supp. 1995).
278. The Federal Act applies to persons with "handicaps." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)
(1994). The definition has been broadly interpreted to include former alcoholics and
drug addicts, the mentally ill, and persons infected with HIV or AIDS. See Hogar
Agua Y Vida En El Desierto v. Suarez, 829 F. Supp. 19, 20 n.1 (D.P.R. 1993) (HIV
and AIDS); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 459
(D.N.J. 1992) (drug and alcohol addiction); Easter Seal Soc'y of N.J., Inc. v. Town-
ship of N. Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228, 233 (D.N.J. 1992) (mentally impaired). The
Arkansas Act will not likely be interpreted as broadly, given the limitations on the
definition of disability. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(3) (Supp. 1995).
279. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-203 (Supp. 1995). The federal Fair Housing Act
contains identical protected statuses. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994). Disability and famil-
ial status were added as protected statuses under federal law in 1988. See F. Willis
Caruso, Fair Housing Modifications and Accommodations in the '90s, 29 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 331 (1996).
280. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-204(a) (Supp. 1995).
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(4) Refuse to negotiate for a real estate transaction with
a person;
(5) Represent to a person that real property is not avail-
able for inspection, sale, rental, or lease when in fact it
is so available, or knowingly fail to bring a property list-
ing to a person's attention, or refuse to permit a person
to inspect real property;
(6) Make, print, or publish or cause to be made, printed,
or published, any notice, statement, or advertisement
with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indi-
cates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or
national origin or an intention to make any such prefer-
ence, limitation, or discrimination; or
(7) Offer, solicit, accept, use, or retain a listing of real
property with the understanding that a person may be
discriminated against in a real estate transaction or in
the furnishing of facilities or services in connection
therewith.281
A real estate broker or salesman is defined in an earlier
section of the Arkansas Act.282 However, the Arkansas Act
applies to others besides real estate brokers or salesmen,
essentially encompassing any person involved in a real es-
tate transaction (including, for example, the owner of a
home who is selling it).
281. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-204(a)(1)-(7) (Supp. 1995). Parallel federal
legislation, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and its 1988 amendment extending cover-
age to individuals with disabilities, prohibits roughly the same categories of discrimi-
nation "in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny" residential
property to protected persons. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(d) (1994). In addition,
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in public
accommodations, and may also apply to housing discrimination under appropriate
circumstances.
282. The Act defines a real estate broker or salesman as
a person, whether licensed or not, who:
(A) For or with the expectation of receiving consideration, lists, sells,
purchases, exchanges, rents or leases real property; (B) Negotiates or at-
tempts to negotiate any of those activities; (C) Holds himself out as en-
gaged in those activities; (D) Negotiates or attempts to negotiate a loan
secured or to be secured by a mortgage or other encumbrance upon real
property; (E) Is engaged in the business of listing real property in a publi-
cation; or (F) Is a person employed by or acting on behalf of a real estate
broker or salesman.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-202(2) (Supp. 1995).
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The AFHA covers a broader range of properties than
the federal act. Unlike parallel federal legislation, it is not
limited to dwellings or residences,283 but should also include
commercial real estate.284 The terms "real estate transac-
tion ' 28 5 and "real property '286 are broadly defined under
the Arkansas Act, making the AFHA applicable to the
"sale, exchange, rental, or lease '287 of a "building, structure,
mobile home, real estate, land, mobile home park, trailer
park, tenement, leasehold, or an interest in a real estate co-
operative or condominium. '288
The AFHA also contains fewer exemptions than fed-
eral statutes. It exempts only (1) housing that contains two
units where one unit is occupied by the owner or his or her
family member and (2) housing rented by an owner who
has temporarily vacated the premises for up to twelve
months.289 In comparison, the federal act exempts (1)
homes rented by owners of three or fewer homes who do
not advertise their properties for rent or use an agent for
rental purposes and (2) dwellings for four or fewer fami-
lies.290 The familial status protection under the federal act
does not apply to "housing for older persons" as defined
under that law.291 There is no parallel exemption under the
AFHA. The federal act does not preclude "reasonable lo-
cal, state, or federal restrictions" on the maximum number
of occupants who may live in a dwelling.292 The federal act
contains exemptions for religious organizations and private
clubs.293 The AFHA contains no parallel exemption for pri-
283. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (1994).
284. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-202(3)-(4) (Supp. 1995) (broadly defining real
estate transaction and real property); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-204 (Supp. 1995)
(broadly prohibiting discrimination in real estate transactions generally).
285. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-202(3) (Supp. 1995).
286. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-202(4) (Supp. 1995).
287. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-202(3) (Supp. 1995).
288. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-202(4) (Supp. 1995).
289. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-204(b) (Supp. 1995).
290. 42 U.S.C. § 3606(b) (1994).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b) (1994). The federal act precludes personal liability for
monetary damages against persons who relied on this exemption in good faith.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (1994).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (1994).
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vate clubs.294 However, the AFHA does not prohibit a reli-
gious organization "from limiting the sale, rental, or
occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other
than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion,
or from giving a preference to such persons. 295 Aside from
this exemption, the AFHA should cover more properties
and more landlords than parallel federal law.296
Another striking difference between the federal and
the state laws is the lack of an administrative process pro-
vided for a potential plaintiff to pursue a defendant in court
under the AFHA. Under the federal Fair Housing Act, a
plaintiff has the option of filing an administrative complaint
with the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment.297 The conciliation and administrative process avail-
able under the federal law can be advantageous to a
plaintiff because of its lower cost and streamlined proce-
dures. In this respect, the AFHA has a distinct disadvan-
tage. However, to potential plaintiffs whose properties do
not fall within the federal act, the AFHA does create a
form of relief that would otherwise be unavailable.
The AFHA is potentially deficient in an area that is
significant under the federal act. It is not clear whether the
act requires a landlord to require reasonable modifications
for individuals with disabilities.298 Under the federal act, a'
landlord must modify a unit if a tenant so requests unless
circumstances support a denial. 299 Additions such as adding
grab bars to bathrooms are generally considered reason-
able.300 Further, the federal Act requires landlords to make
294. However, the public accommodation section contains an exemption for pri-
vate clubs. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7)(B) (Supp. 1995). In addition, the em-
ployment discrimination section contains an exemption for religious organizations.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-103(a) (Supp. 1995). Neither of these exemptions are
applicable to the AFHA.
295. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-206(a) (Supp. 1995).
296. A thorough description of federal fair housing laws is beyond the scope of
this article. For more information about these laws, see A Fair Housing Enforce-
ment Symposium: A Focus on Special Issues Affecting the Disabled, Families with
Children and the First Amendment, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 315 (1996).
297. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(1)(A)(I), 3612(a) (1994).
298. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (1994); 24 C.F.R. § 100.203 (1996).
299. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203 (1994).
300. Id.
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modifications to enable a tenant with a disability to acquire
or enjoy a housing unit.30 1 However, they can be read into
the AFHA's proscription of discrimination in the "terms,
conditions, or privileges of a real estate transaction or in the
furnishing of facilities or services in connection there-
with. 30 2 If, for example, showers were inaccessible to per-
sons in wheelchairs, this arguably would constitute
discrimination in the furnishing of facilities. If such accom-
modations are read into the AFHA, it is not clear how sig-
nificant a modification would be required of landlords.
The AFHA has a specific section addressing real estate
financing. It prohibits "[a] person to whom application is
made for financial assistance or financing in connection
with a real estate transaction or in connection with the con-
struction, rehabilitation, repair, maintenance, or improve-
ment of real property" from discriminating against an
applicant based on his or her religion, race, color, national
origin, sex, disability, or familial status or such a character-
istic of a person living with the applicant. 30 3 This section
covers a significant problem. "Studies show that minorities
are 60 percent less likely to get lending help than a white
person with the same credit rating.30 4 In addition, it forbids
applications that are used to keep track of a person's reli-
gion, race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or familial
status of the applicant or someone residing with the appli-
cant.30 5 The application cannot be used to show a "prefer-
ence, limitation, specification, or discrimination" based on
one of these protected characteristics.30 6 This section ex-
empts applications required by certain lenders under the
National Housing Act,307 or "by a regulatory board or of-
301. See, e.g., Hodges v. Schmoeller, No. 94C 4907 (N.D. I11. Aug. 12,1994). See
generally F. Willis Caruso, Fair Housing Modifications and Accommodations in the
'90s, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 331 (1996).
302. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-204(a)(2) (Supp. 1995).
303. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-205(a)(1) (Supp. 1995). The federal act contains
a similar prohibition. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1994).
304. Private Bar Opportunities in Fair Housing Lending, 21 HUMAN RIGHTS 40
(Fall 1994).
305. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-205(a)(2) (Supp. 1995).
306. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-205(a)(2) (Supp. 1995).
307. 12 U.S.C. §9 1701-1750g (1994).
214
ARKANSAS CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
ficer acting under the statutory authority of this state or the
United States. 30 8
The Arkansas Act also forbids and expressly voids any
sort of contractual conditions, restrictions or prohibitions
that limit the use or occupancy of property on the basis of
religion, race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or famil-
ial status.0 9 It also prohibits a person from inserting such a
term into a "written instrument" or honoring any such void
term.310
Like the federal act,311 the AFHA contains what is in
essence a hate crimes provision related to housing. It pro-
hibits any person from threatening, intimidating, or inter-
fering "with persons in the enjoyment of their dwelling
because of the race, color, national origin, sex, or familial
status of such persons, or of visitors or associates of such
persons. '312 It also forbids any sort of retaliation, including
discharging, threatening, coercing, or intimidating an em-
ployee, real estate broker, agent or other person for refus-
ing to take part in a "discriminatory housing practice or
because he or she had aided or encouraged any other per-
son in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted under
the provisions" of the Act.313
The AFHA contains another retaliation section, which
covers conspiracies, including conspiracies to retaliate, vio-
late the act, or interfere with a person's compliance with the
Arkansas Act.314 It forbids two or more persons from con-
spiring to retaliate against a person because he or she op-
posed a violation of the AFHA or was involved in a
complaint, either by filing such a complaint, testifying re-
308. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-205(b) (Supp. 1995).
309. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-206(a) (Supp. 1995).
310. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-206(b) (Supp. 1995).
311. 42 U.S. C. § 3617 (1994). The federal act makes it illegal "to coerce, intimi-
date, threaten or interfere" with any person's right to fair housing. Id. It also makes
it a "criminal offense to willfully injure, intimidate or interfere with, by force or
threat of force, any person's fair housing rights." See generally Michael P. Seng,
Hate Speech and Enforcement of Fair Housing Laws, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 409
(1996).
312. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-206(c) (Supp. 1995). The federal act's proscrip-
tion has been criticized on First Amendment grounds. See Seng, supra note 312.
313. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-206(c) (Supp. 1995).
314. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-208 (Supp. 1995).
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garding such a complaint, assisting or participating in an in-
vestigation, proceeding or hearing under the AFHA.315
This section echoes the language of the earlier section in-
volving retaliation against employees, brokers, or agents
who refuse to take part in discriminatory activities covered
by the Arkansas Act.316 Finally, it forbids conspiracies to
violate the Arkansas Act as well as interfering with a per-
son's compliance with the Act.317
Perhaps the most interesting part of the Arkansas Act
is its prohibition of representations regarding property val-
ues. To understand the full import of this section of the
Act, it is necessary to review it in its entirety:
A person shall not represent, for the purpose of induc-
ing a real estate transaction from which the person may
benefit financially, that a change has occurred or will or
may occur in the composition, with respect to the reli-
gion, race, color, national origin, sex, disability, or fa-
milial status of the owners or occupants, in the block,
neighborhood, or area in which the real property is lo-
cated or represent that this change will or may result in
the lowering of property values, an increase in criminal
or antisocial behavior, or a decline in the quality of
schools in the block, neighborhood, or area in which the
real property is located.318
Similar speech-related statutes and ordinances have been
upheld after First Amendment challenges. 319 Indeed, the
federal act contains a similar provision.320 However, sev-
eral commentators have criticized the hate crimes portions
of fair housing laws on First Amendment grounds.32'
315. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-208(1) (Supp. 1995).
316. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-208(4) (Supp. 1995).
317. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-208(2)-(3) (Supp. 1995).
318. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-207 (Supp. 1995).
319. See Linmark Assocs. Inc. v. willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 89 (1977) (permitting
town to prohibit posting of "for sale" signs to promote integrated neighborhoods);
United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973) (racist representations of real estate persons not
protected speech under the First Amendment). For more on First Amendment im-
plications, see Seng, supra note 312.
320. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d)-(e) (1994).
321. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-210(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).
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Finally, the Fair Housing Act provides for a civil action
for injunctive relief, damages, or both. The AFHA defines
damages as "damages for injury or loss caused by each vio-
lation of this subchapter, including a reasonable attorney's
fees. '322 While this section makes attorney's fees appear
mandatory to a successful plaintiff, a later provision states
that "the court in its discretion may allow the prevailing
party reasonable attorney's fees and costs. ' 323 In addition,
there is yet another provision on attorney's fees stating that
"[a] court rendering a judgment in an action brought pursu-
ant to this subchapter may award all or a portion of the
costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees and
witness fees, to the complainant in the action if the court
determines that the award is appropriate. '324  While this
seems to imply that defendants, if they do prevail, could not
obtain attorney's fees, the earlier section makes awards dis-
cretionary for any "prevailing party." If the Act is inter-
preted consistently with federal civil rights laws, attorney's
fees will only be awarded to the defendant in cases that can
be characterized as "unfounded, meritless, frivolous or vex-
atiously brought. ' 325 Unlike other sections of the Arkansas
Civil Rights Act, venue is specifically set in the circuit court
in the county in which the violation occurred or where the
defendant resides or has his principal place of business.326
322. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-210(a)(2) (Supp. 1995).
323. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-210(c) (Supp. 1995).
324. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-210(d) (Supp. 1995).
325. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (quoting
United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 1975)).
326. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-210(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1995). Given that the
AFHA provides for injunctive relief, it is not clear whether venue in the circuit court
is appropriate. The Arkansas Supreme Court has voided such venue provisions con-
tained in statutes when they are contrary to the state constitutional requirement of
separate courts of law and courts of equity. ARK. CONST. art. 7, §11; Bates v. Bates,
793 S.W.2d 788 (Ark. 1990); Patterson v. McKay, 134 S.W.2d 543 (Ark. 1939). In
Bates, the Arkansas Supreme Court held the state's Domestic Abuse Act, ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-15-101-211 (1993 & Supp. 1995) unconstitutional because it as-
signed actions under that Act to the chancery courts. Bates, 793 S.W.2d at 791.
Even though the Domestic Abuse Act provided for relief that appeared equitable in
nature, such as restraining orders, the court held that because the Act created a new
cause of action that did not exist in equity at the time the constitution was enacted in
1874, this case was not cognizable in a chancery court. Id. at 790. In addition, the
court refused to expand equity jurisdiction to such actions because other Arkansas
code provisions made plaintiff's remedy at law adequate. Id. at 791. The legisla-
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CONCLUSION
The. Arkansas Civil Rights Act constitutes sweeping
civil rights legislation. While not entirely clear on all points,
it offers comprehensive coverage for a wide variety of civil
rights violations. In addition to the sections aimed at dis-
crimination in employment, contracts, voting and partici-
pating in government, and real estate transactions, it
provides a cause of action against governmental entities for
violation of constitutional and statutory rights. Finally, its
coverage for hate crimes is novel for this state and goes well
beyond civil rights statutes in other states. 27 Aside from
the more recently enacted Fair Housing sections of the Act,
given the Arkansas Act's broad reach, its lack of use re-
mains a mystery. Through this article, I have endeavored to
make an in-depth analysis of the various sections of the Ar-
kansas Act, in the hope that attorneys practicing in the civil
rights area will use it at least in those situations in which
federal law provides no relief. While several important sec-
tions of the Arkansas Act remain less than clear, it still pro-
vides gap-filling causes of action that should help
Arkansans in their quest for fair treatment. Further, clarifi-
ture's vesting of jurisdiction in the circuit courts for housing discrimination claims,
under the analysis of Bates, is appropriate so long as such claims would not be con-
sidered in equity in 1874, although it would appear that the circuit courts could not
grant equitable relief, such as injunctions or orders requiring a landlord to lease an
apartment to the plaintiff. Cummings v. Fingers, 753 S.W.2d 865 (Ark. 1988); Bates,
793 S.W.2d at 791 (Glaze, J., dissenting). But see Daley v. Digby, 613 S.W.2d 589
(Ark. 1981); Pinckney v. Mass Merchandisers, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Ark. App.
1985) (mere mention of equitable relief in complaint did not give equity court exclu-
sive jurisdiction). For more on Bates, see Mark R. Killenbeck, Nothing That We Can
Do? Or Much Ado About Nothing? Some Thoughts on Bates v. Bates, Equity, and
Domestic Abuse in Arkansas, 43 ARK. L. REV. 725 (1990); Shayne D. Smith, Note,
The Domestic Abuse Act of 1989-An Impermissible Expansion of Chancery Court
Jurisdiction, Bates v. Bates, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 537 (1990-91). For a
general discussion regarding the division of law and equity in Arkansas, see Morton
Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery Courts:
Historical Anomalies and Political Realities, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 215
(1995).
327. More and more states have enacted various forms of hate crimes statutes.
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 436, 483 n.4 (1993) (listing states that have en-
acted penalty enhancement statutes for bias-motivated crimes); Sally J. Greenberg,
The Massachusetts Hate Crime Reporting Act of 1990: Great Expectations Yet Unful-
filled? 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 103, 158 n.4 (1996) (citing states with data collection
laws regarding hate crimes).
1997] ARKANSAS CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 219
cation of these sections will not come until the local bar
starts to sue under the Arkansas Act, giving the judiciary a
chance to interpret those sections that are less than clear.
One thing does remain obvious, however. The Arkansas
Civil Rights Act stands as positive statement by Arkansas
that it will not tolerate discrimination in a variety of forms.
